Liquidity and the convergence to market efficiency by Young, Nicara Romi
i | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
LIQUIDITY AND THE CONVERGENCE TO MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
M.Com Business Finance 
(50% weighting) 
 
by 
 
 
NICARA YOUNG 
567597 
 
 
MASTER OF COMMERCE (FINANCE) 
 
in the 
 
FINANCE DIVISION, 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS SCIENCES 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG  
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: PROF. CHRISTO AURET 
 
 
Date of submission: 6 September 2017 
 
Word count: 26 200 
ii | P a g e  
 
DECLARATION 
I, Nicara Young, declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce in Finance at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree 
or examination at this or any other university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicara Young 
September 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
iii | P a g e  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the following people for their support in the completion of this research 
report: My supervisor, Professor Christo Auret, not only for his guidance and encouragement 
during this process, but for being a deeply valued mentor and teacher throughout my academic 
career; my family for being my most dedicated champions; my lecturers and advisers at the 
School of Economic and Business Sciences for their contributions to my journey at Wits: 
Professor Robert Vivian, David McClelland, James Britten, Daniel Page and Yudhvir 
Seetharam. Finally, I would like to thank Martin Koch, Lee-Ann Govender and Mesansha 
Pillay from the JSE for their invaluable assistance in data collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv | P a g e  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 - Market inefficiency trend, 2012 – 2016 ............................................................................... 39 
Figure 2 - Daily aggregate turnover, 2012 – 2016 ................................................................................ 40 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Summary statistics .................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients between daily returns and lagged order imbalances ........................ 37 
Table 3: Univariate predictive regression ............................................................................................. 38 
Table 4: Distribution of the liquidity indicator during liquid & illiquid days, by regime ..................... 41 
Table 5: Multivariate predictive regressions ......................................................................................... 42 
Table 6: ADF and PP tests on the order imbalance series .................................................................... 44 
Table 7: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the daily order imbalance series ......................... 45 
Table 8: Regression of inverse market efficiency measure .................................................................. 45 
Table 9: ADF and PP tests on the order imbalance coefficient series .................................................. 48 
Table 10: ADF and PP tests on the aggregate turnover and first difference series ............................... 48 
Table 11: Granger causality tests .......................................................................................................... 49 
Table 12: Fifteen-minute/daily return variance ratios ........................................................................... 50 
Table 13: Open-to-close/close-to-open return variance ratios .............................................................. 53 
Table 14: ADF and PP tests on the daily return series .......................................................................... 53 
Table 15: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the daily return series ....................................... 53 
Table 16: ADF and PP tests on the squared daily return series ............................................................ 55 
Table 17: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the squared daily return series .......................... 56 
Table A1: Order imbalance series ADF test, Regime 1 ........................................................................ 76 
Table A2: Order imbalance series PP test, Regime 1 ........................................................................... 77 
Table A3: Order imbalance series ADF test, Regime 2 ........................................................................ 78 
Table A4: Order imbalance series PP test, Regime 2 ........................................................................... 79 
Table A5: Order imbalance series ADF test, Regime 3 ........................................................................ 80 
Table A6: Order imbalance series PP test, Regime 3 ........................................................................... 81 
Table A7: Correlogram of the order imbalance series, Regime 1 ......................................................... 82 
Table A8: Correlogram of the order imbalance series, Regime 2 ......................................................... 83 
Table A9: Correlogram of the order imbalance series, Regime 3 ......................................................... 84 
v | P a g e  
 
Table A10: Order imbalance coefficient series ADF test ..................................................................... 85 
Table A11: Order imbalance coefficient series PP test ......................................................................... 86 
Table A12: Aggregate turnover series ADF test ................................................................................... 87 
Table A13: Aggregate turnover series PP test ...................................................................................... 88 
Table A14: First difference in aggregate turnover series ADF test ...................................................... 89 
Table A15: First difference in aggregate turnover series PP test .......................................................... 90 
Table A16: Granger Causality test, Entire Sample ............................................................................... 91 
Table A17: Granger Causality test, Regime 1 ...................................................................................... 91 
Table A18: Granger Causality test, Regime 2 ...................................................................................... 91 
Table A19: Granger Causality test, Regime 3 ...................................................................................... 92 
Table A20: Daily return series ADF test, Regime 1 ............................................................................. 93 
Table A21: Daily return series PP test, Regime 1 ................................................................................. 94 
Table A22: Daily return series ADF test, Regime 2 ............................................................................. 95 
Table A23: Daily return series PP test, Regime 2 ................................................................................. 96 
Table A24: Daily return series ADF test, Regime 3 ............................................................................. 97 
Table A25: Daily return series PP test, Regime 3 ................................................................................. 98 
Table A26: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 1 ............................................................................ 99 
Table A27: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 2 .......................................................................... 100 
Table A28: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 3 .......................................................................... 101 
Table A29: Squared daily return series ADF test, Regime 1 .............................................................. 102 
Table A30: Squared daily return series PP test, Regime 1 ................................................................. 103 
Table A31: Squared daily return series ADF test, Regime 2 .............................................................. 104 
Table A32: Squared daily return series PP test, Regime 2 ................................................................. 105 
Table A33: Squared daily return series ADF test, Regime 3 .............................................................. 106 
Table A34: Squared daily return series PP test, Regime 3 ................................................................. 107 
Table A35: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 1 ............................................................. 108 
Table A36: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 2 ............................................................. 109 
Table A37: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 3 ............................................................. 110 
 
 
 
vi | P a g e  
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between market liquidity changes on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), and the market’s degree of efficiency. Market efficiency 
is characterised in terms of two philosophies: Fama’s (1970) Efficient Markets Hypothesis, and 
Shiller’s (1981; 2003) informational efficiency designation. Efficiency was tested using 
measures of return predictability, a random walk benchmark, and price volatility; liquidity was 
measured using market turnover. The tests were conducted on JSE Top 40 shares across three 
regimes, spanning January 2012 – June 2016. The regimes are demarcated by two structural 
breaks in the JSE’s microstructure: the 2012 trading platform upgrade, and the 2014 colocation 
centre launch. The results show that past order imbalances are a significant predictor of daily 
returns, although the significance of this predictability has dissipated over time. Return 
predictability is not influenced by liquidity. In fact, there is evidence that illiquidity weakens 
return predictability. Prices were closer to random walk benchmarks during the third regime. 
In consideration of informational efficiency, during the latter two regimes price volatility is 
greater during trading versus non-trading hours. This is coupled with an emergence of 
nonlinear return dependence, which is indicative of greater mispricing. Thus, over the three 
regimes, market efficiency improved in the sense of the EMH, but informational efficiency 
deteriorated. The study contributes to the field by: introducing an inverse measure of market 
efficiency; providing insight into the measure’s time variation and relation to liquidity; and 
demonstrating that market efficiency tests should incorporate its dual meanings, enabling richer 
understanding of their intersection.  
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The organised stock market is one of the most ingenious constructs born of modern capitalism. 
It allows corporations to raise capital by issuing ownership stakes in their businesses. It 
facilitates trade in these claims, with the market maker ensuring no direct negotiation between 
buyers and sellers is necessary. The financial market’s effectiveness in performing both of 
these functions depends critically on two qualities: efficiency and liquidity.  
 
1.1  MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Any product adept at serving its purpose can be described as efficient. In the case of financial 
markets, efficiency is two-pronged. Efficiency may describe the inability to earn returns on 
assets in excess of expectations, after adjusting for the risk taken on. It may also describe a 
rational expectations paradigm in which asset prices are a perfect reflection of their true values. 
As will be reasoned in what follows, these two concepts are far from equivalent.  
The much-lauded and equally challenged Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1970) 
is attuned to the first arm of ‘two-pronged efficiency’: an efficient capital market is one that is 
sufficiently competitive so that investors cannot expect to realise abnormal (or arbitrage) 
profits from trading strategies, where an abnormal profit is defined as a return in excess of what 
is expected based on the risk of an asset or portfolio. In more formal terms, Fama’s (1970) idea 
of efficiency is the speed and degree to which prices adjust to fully reflect all available, relevant 
information. All that is pertinent to the computation of the price has already been impounded 
into its observed value today. As new information arrives randomly, if prices adjust instantly 
to the new information then price changes should be random. The natural implication of this is 
a lack of asset return predictability from past prices or information. An extension of the ‘fair 
game’ efficient markets model is that the path of past and future prices follows a ‘random 
walk’: price changes are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The EMH and random 
walk theory are not necessarily interchangeable ideas: although statistically significant non-
random behaviour is sufficient to reject the random walk hypothesis, the EMH can only be 
rejected if it can be shown that the statistical non-randomness can be used to beat the market. 
However, non-randomness is still relevant to tests of market efficiency, as the less non-
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randomness, the lower the chance of finding trading strategies that yield superior returns. See 
Strebel (1977). 
Importantly, the EMH does not completely rule out minor instances of price predictability. 
What it does maintain is that deviations from efficiency, such as return predictability or non-
randomness, are traded away so quickly that, on average, it is not possible to earn an arbitrage 
profit.  
Fama’s (1970) description of market efficiency is quite distinct from that of Shiller (1981; 
2003), who emphasises the conformity of prices to fundamental values as a designation of 
efficiency: ‘The idea [is] that speculative asset prices such as stock prices always incorporate 
the best information about fundamental values and that prices change only because of good, 
sensible information’ (Shiller, 2003, p. 83). How well financial asset prices follow fundamental 
values will depend on market consensus on the value of the asset, but as will be discussed later, 
market consensus on value can be disrupted by investor biases and by asymmetric information. 
If investors exhibit irrational behaviour such as herding, overreaction or under-reaction, this 
can generate divergence of asset prices from true values. Similarly, if there are market 
participants with superior information, but who are not able to trade on this information, then 
the market price cannot reflect the true, fundamental value. 
In order to avoid possible confusion due to the dual use of the term ‘efficiency’, it will 
henceforth be qualified. When referring to the Fama (1970) description, ‘the EMH’, ‘random 
walk theory’ or ‘lack of return predictability’ will be used. The Shiller (1981; 2003) usage can 
be referred to as ‘informational efficiency’, ‘price informativeness’, ‘transparency’, or 
‘fundamental value’. 
The important question is why academics and practitioners should care about market efficiency 
in the sense of both Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003). The validity of Fama’s (1970) EMH 
has for decades been the subject of heated debate in the academic literature, but it cannot be 
denied that its central tenet underpins almost every aspect of finance theory. Accordingly, 
knowledge of the drivers and dynamics of the EMH, and whether it can be reconciled with 
Shiller’s (1981; 2003) description of efficiency, should be welcomed by the academic 
community. The EMH has direct implications for market participants when they transact. 
Investors who pursue active portfolio management rely on the hope of beating the market: for 
instance, the predictability of stock returns affects the profitability of technical trading 
strategies, and the ability to earn returns in excess of what would be expected according to an 
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asset’s risk. Price informativeness (accurate pricing of fundamentals) is an even more important 
consideration for corporate management than it is for academics. Firms rely on market 
transparency when obtaining access to capital and calculating its cost, when valuing corporate 
takeover deals, and when determining manager compensation.  
 
1.2 MARKET LIQUIDITY 
A second characteristic of a well-functioning market is the liquidity of its traded assets. A liquid 
asset is one which can be promptly traded or converted into cash, at a low cost of transaction 
and without having to bear undue sacrifice on the price. Liu (2006) identifies four dimensions 
of liquidity – trading speed, trading quantity (turnover or volume), trading cost, and price 
impact. ‘Undue sacrifice on the price’ is a trading cost that describes having to purchase the 
asset at a higher price and sell at a lower price than if it were more liquid. ‘Price impact’ is the 
effect of trade on the future price, as a consequence of the asset’s illiquidity. The sources of 
illiquidity are wide-ranging: exogenous transaction costs such as brokerage fees; demand 
pressure and inventory risk; private information about share fundamentals and/ or order flow; 
and search frictions associated with locating a trading partner and negotiating a price in an 
imperfectly competitive context (Amihud, Mendelson & Pedersen, 2005).   
A developing body of literature speaks of the ‘liquidity premium’, or the return compensation 
required by investors for holding an illiquid asset (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Amihud, 2002; 
Liu, 2006; McClelland, 2014). Capital markets aid in the trading of assets, but the constituent 
assets can, and do, vary in the degree of trading friction and transaction costs in the cross-
section and across time. The liquidity or ease of trade of a company’s shares is influenced by 
the nuances of the firm, such as its size and investors’ perceptions of the riskiness of the 
business. For example, there tends to be a wider bid-ask spread (a direct measure of transaction 
cost) for smaller and riskier firms. More than that, the structure of the market on which the 
share is listed can impact its ease of trade (O’Hara, 2015). Research of market microstructure 
theory is pivotal to understanding both asset pricing and the process by which markets become 
efficient (O’Hara, 1997), but the South African literature has been relatively silent on how asset 
returns and price formation are affected by the market which defines the setting to these 
phenomena.  
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Market liquidity is inextricably tied to market microstructure. Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) as well as Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) (on raw data) 
documented that successive reductions in the minimum tick size of U.S. stocks were 
accompanied by exogenous decreases in bid-ask spreads. Muranaga (1999) studied dynamic 
aspects of market liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Besides trade frequency being found 
to be positively correlated with indicators of static and dynamic market liquidity, the paper uses 
an event study to conclude that a reduction in tick size of the Japanese exchange in 1998 
resulted in decreased bid-ask spreads and price volatility, and increased trade frequency, 
implying a likely improvement in market liquidity and efficiency.  
The benefits of liquid secondary markets cannot be overstated: investors value liquidity, and, 
ceteris paribus, will accept lower yields on securities that trade in liquid markets than on those 
in illiquid markets. Therefore, a liquid market reduces the cost of capital to firms and 
encourages real investment in the economy. Liquidity is also of interest to policy makers, 
regulators, and the securities exchange itself. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has 
made substantial efforts to bolster liquidity through innovation of its securities trading, clearing 
and settlement processes. While still a rather thinly traded market by international standards, 
there has been a marked improvement in the JSE’s liquidity over the past two decades. The 
1990s ushered in a new era of investor participation on the South African exchange, embodied 
by changes in local and international laws and regulations, increased information 
dissemination, as well as a modernisation of the market microstructure. On 7 June 1996, the 
final bell signalling the close of trade sounded for the last time on the open outcry trading floor. 
Since then, trading has been conducted electronically, but the automated trading platform has 
been upgraded to faster and more efficient technology no fewer than three times – in 2002, 
2007 and 2012. These significant technological advancements to the market microstructure 
represent distinct structural breaks in the evolution of the exchange’s liquidity. A direct 
measure of liquidity – the total annual value traded as a percentage of the market capitalisation 
of listed shares – ranged between 4 and 7 per cent during 1991-1994 (Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Monthly Bulletin, 1991-1994). This figure was 43.2 per cent in 2015 (JSE, 2015a), 
a sign of the advancement in market liquidity in recent years.  
The increased liquidity brought on by the continuous upgrades of the electronic trading systems 
stimulates high-frequency and algorithmic trading (AT) activity, which facilitates arbitrage and 
decreases the autocorrelation of stock returns, as concluded in Chaboud, Chiquoine, 
Hjalmarsson and Vega (2014) in their analysis of algorithmic trading in the foreign exchange 
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market. High-frequency and algorithmic trading uses computer programmes to place trades 
based on a defined set of instructions, at speeds and frequencies impossible for human traders. 
 
1.3 LIQUID AND EFFICIENT MARKETS 
The myriad of studies, both theoretical and empirical, on both market liquidity and market 
efficiency (in Fama’s (1970) sense and Shiller’s (1981; 2003) sense) evidences the significance 
of these topics to finance academics and practitioners. But what is most interesting and relevant 
to investors and listed firms alike, is the interaction between the two. Specifically, how does 
the structure of a market – including the ease of transaction – influence price formation and 
behaviour? Intuition tells us that if the market microstructure enables easier, faster, and less 
costly trading activity, then astute investors should more readily exploit deviations from 
efficiency. When return predictability materialises, agents recognising the pattern will 
eradicate it through their trading. When new information arrives, traders can act on it without 
fear of undue sacrifice on the price, and in the process they bring prices closer toward 
equilibrium or full-information values. Accordingly, market liquidity should have a close 
relationship with market efficiency, since it affects the price discovery function, as well as 
uncertainties relating to how well market prices reveal all available information or the 
temporary divergence of market prices from equilibrium values (Muranaga, 1999; Muranaga 
& Shimizu, 1999).  
Understanding the relationship between market structure, liquidity and price behaviour is 
important for theoretical and practical reasons (Madhavan, 1992). The efficiency of price 
formation under alternate trading designs sheds light on the factors affecting the aggregation 
of information in prices. Additionally, Madhavan (1992) points out that the securities industry 
is experiencing rapid structural shifts generated by intermarket competition and innovations in 
communications technology. Therefore an understanding of the relationship between market 
structure and price formation is needed to evaluate the impact of these changes and to guide 
public policy. If one can clarify the mechanism which most affects the price discovery process, 
it will provide a good reference in considering measures designed to improve market 
efficiency. 
It seems reasonable to assume that trade ought to be easier in a more active exchange, and the 
market should thus be more liquid. Indeed, Demsetz’s (1968) seminal work showed that more 
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frequently traded stocks have smaller bid-ask spreads. Existing research papers on the relation 
between stock price movements and trading activity (Hiemstra & Jones, 1994; Lo & Wang, 
2000) are myopic to the extent that they rely on volume as a measure of trading activity – this 
overlooks the implications of imbalances for stock return behaviour (Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam, 2004). Order imbalances are more powerful than conventional measures of 
trading activity in explaining stock returns because market makers react to high absolute order 
imbalances by adjusting their inventory, and order imbalances signal excessive investor interest 
in a share, which, if autocorrelated, could induce a relationship between order imbalances and 
future returns. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) delve into the link between market 
liquidity and market efficiency by conducting analyses using return, order flow, and liquidity 
data for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks that traded every day over the period 1993 
to 2002, using five-minute intraday intervals to analyse order flow and returns. The structural 
breaks that define exogenous changes in liquidity regimes are denoted by discrete reductions 
in the minimum tick size, which correspond to decreases in bid-ask spreads. The rationale is 
that short-horizon return predictability from the lagged order imbalance (a measure of trading 
activity) is an inverse indicator of market efficiency. Returns are not predictable over a daily 
horizon, but market inefficiencies can arise during very short, intraday horizons if investors 
need time to process new information or if they face constraints that limit their transactions. 
Chordia et al. (2008) find that short-horizon return predictability declines significantly during 
more liquid regimes, and variance ratio tests using intraday and daily midquote returns point 
toward greater conformity to random walk benchmarks during more liquid regimes. The 
authors interpret their empirical results as indicative of an intimate link between daily liquidity 
and intraday market efficiency; market efficiency (in Fama’s (1970) sense) improved during 
times of enhanced market liquidity.  
Financial market inefficiency does not rest solely on the presence of price predictability or the 
lack of convergence to a random walk benchmark. Even if prices cannot be predicted from past 
public information, they can reflect varying levels of private information. In addition to 
reducing stock return predictability, exogenous increases in liquidity may result in a more 
effective incorporation of new information into prices, if the increased liquidity is accompanied 
by lower trading costs, such as bid-ask spreads or measures of price impact. Such a cost 
reduction is more conducive to trading on private information about fundamental values, and 
enhances informational efficiency (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988). Besides the costs of 
transacting, the extent to which stock prices reflect all information hinges on the cost of 
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producing information: the smaller these costs, the more efficient is the market (Chordia, Roll 
& Subrahmanyam, 2005). Chordia et al. (2008) confirm this hypothesis using two statistics 
associated with information processing. They find that open-to-close/close-to-open return 
variance ratios increased and first-order daily return autocorrelations decreased (especially for 
small firms) as liquidity improved. These two results together signify increased trading on 
private information (French & Roll, 1986). The evidence of Chordia et al. (2008) suggests that 
liquidity increases the efficiency of accommodating order flows, encourages arbitrage activity, 
and engenders an incorporation of private information into prices, which in turn improves the 
market’s informational efficiency. 
The primary aim of this study is to understand whether changes in market liquidity levels of 
the JSE are related to variations in its degree of efficiency. Specifically, liquidity (measured by 
an aggregate market turnover metric) can enhance efficiency via two channels. First, liquidity 
may facilitate arbitrage activity by allowing faster and less costly trading. High-frequency and 
algorithmic trading are conducted on an electronic platform. The faster, cheaper and more 
efficient the trading process, the more high-frequency and algorithmic activity will infuse daily 
trading; this increase in arbitrage activity may diminish return predictability. This first 
‘efficiency channel’ is tested using measures of daily return predictability and conformity to a 
random walk benchmark. Second, liquidity encourages trading on private information as it 
allows smart investors to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, with little price impact. 
This enhances informational efficiency by bringing prices closer to fundamental or full-
information values. This second ‘efficiency channel’ is tested using a metric of price volatility 
when the market is open versus when it is closed. The improvement in market efficiency 
brought about by an increase in market liquidity results in efficient fund and risk allocation 
(Muranaga & Shimizu, 1999). A secondary aim of the study is to find alignment between the 
two concepts of market efficiency: return predictability and informational efficiency.  
No market is ever perfectly efficient, as no market is ever perfectly competitive or frictionless. 
The empirical question has always been to what extent a given phenomenon approaches this 
unattainable ideal (Fama, 1970).  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following discussion of the relevant literature is broken into two broad sub-sections: first, 
an outline of the theory and evidence around market efficiency, and second, an overview of the 
literature on the linkages between liquidity and measures of market efficiency. 
 
2.1 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
2.1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY 
Fama’s (1970) formalisation of the theory of efficient capital markets imbued the model with 
implications that could be tested in an empirical context. In particular, stock returns are a ‘fair 
game’ and in equilibrium, prices fully reflect the relevant information set so that investors 
cannot expect to achieve returns in excess of equilibrium expected returns, where the 
equilibrium is defined in terms of an asset pricing model. The random walk nature of stock 
price changes can be thought of as an extension of the ‘fair game’ efficient markets model, 
which ‘arises within the context of [the fair game] model when the environment is 
(fortuitously) such that the evolution of investor tastes and the process generating new 
information combine to produce equilibria in which return distributions repeat themselves 
through time’ (Fama, 1970, p. 387).  
The efficiency of markets was recognised as early as Bachelier (1900), and the difficulty of 
earning returns that beat the market was noted by Cowles (1933; 1944). Later, Kendall (1953), 
in his analysis of serial correlations in stock and commodity price series, would make his famed 
‘Demon of Chance’ analogy in describing the ‘wandering series’ of random fluctuations in 
price changes that he observed. Other notable contributions to the empirical literature that 
would culminate in the random walk model include Roberts (1959), Osborne (1959) and 
Working (1960). Samuelson (1965) presented a proof that in a competitive and well-
functioning market, price changes follow a random walk with no predictable bias.  
The EMH recognises three degrees of market efficiency. Weak-form, semi-strong form, and 
strong-form efficiency describe states in which prices reflect all past, public, and private 
information, respectively. It is generally accepted that most markets are at least weak-form 
efficient (Fama, 1970). In a semi-strong form efficient market, asset prices adjust 
instantaneously to reflect public information, but varying degrees of private information can 
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be reflected in prices in such a market (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2008). Strong-form 
efficiency dictates that the stock price reflects all relevant information, public and private. It 
would be impossible to use any information to realise an abnormal return in this situation.  
The EMH has proven resilient to considerable empirical challenges, which can be attributed to 
the joint hypothesis problem: any test of market efficiency is effectively a test of the joint 
hypotheses of market efficiency and the asset-pricing model used as the benchmark (most 
commonly, the Capital Asset Pricing Model or CAPM). The documentation of persistent stock 
market anomalies is one manifestation of the conundrum posed by the intertwined EMH and 
asset pricing theory. Basu (1977) observed that portfolios of low price-to-earnings (P/E) stocks 
earned excess returns over their high-P/E counterparts, after controlling for the CAPM. Banz 
(1981) found that stocks with small market capitalizations earned positive abnormal returns 
relative to the CAPM expected returns and to large-capitalization stocks. Fama and French 
(1992) showed that much of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns can be captured by a 
model comprising the traditional CAPM market beta combined with factors for size and the 
ratio of book-to-market equity (B/M), which subsumed the roles of earnings-to-price (the 
inverse of P/E) and leverage in predicting returns. While the size effect weakened after the 
1990s, the B/M phenomenon remains as strong as ever, pervading stock markets in South 
Africa and abroad (Auret & Sinclaire, 2006; Basiewicz & Auret, 2009; Bauman, Conover, & 
Miller, 1998). Despite Fama and French’s (1992; 1993) success in explaining the influence of 
B/M in terms of rational asset pricing theory, there is evidence that its predictive power stems 
from investor behavioural factors (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The latter case 
clearly represents a contradiction of the EMH: a strategy of buying high B/M stocks and/ or 
selling low B/M stocks can earn predictable, positive abnormal returns for an investor, in 
excess of what is implied by the risk of the strategy.  
 There exists an uncomfortable dichotomy between the notion of market efficiency in the sense 
of security price reactions to new information, and the parallel sense of how closely prices 
conform to fundamental, ‘rational’ values. Shiller (2003) describes market efficiency as an 
idealistic state of rational expectations in which speculative asset prices always reflect the best 
information pertinent to their fundamental values, and change only due to rational updating on 
the emergence of new information about fundamental values. The challenge to rational market 
efficiency has been concentrated in evidence of excess stock price volatility (Shiller, 1981) and 
behavioural finance theory (Shiller, 2003). 
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A few points are worth noting here. First, what exactly is ‘fundamental value’? It is an entirely 
hypothetical estimation based on the entirely subjective views and assumptions of a great 
number of individual market participants. It is a near-impossible task to determine the true 
fundamental value. Who is to say if one investor’s estimation is better than that of the next 
investor? Moreover, even if the progression of future asset returns is such that one investor 
seems superior in estimating fundamental value, this could be due to pure chance rather than 
any genuine skill. In a market with diversity of opinion and uncertainty of tomorrow, how can 
one know if the fundamental value is reflected in the stock price? Second, nowhere in Fama’s 
(1970) paper is there any mention of fundamental value. It is entirely possible for the stock 
price to be weak-form efficient according to Fama (1970) - it cannot be predicted from past 
public information - but at the same time to be incorrectly valued, as there is some information 
about fundamental value that is not reflected in the price. The reconciliation of Fama (1970) 
and Shiller (1981; 2003) into a central concept of efficiency seems elusive. However, a first 
step can be taken in recognising that strong-form efficiency (Fama, 1970) can be considered a 
state in which market prices reflect fundamental value, provided that investors process all 
information rationally. Strong-form efficiency corresponds to a fully revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium (Madhavan, 1992). A strong-form efficient market bars abnormal 
profits from trading on any information about asset prices – by definition, then, the price should 
reflect economic fundamentals. 
 
2.1.2 NOISE TRADERS, INFORMATION TRADERS, AND EFFICIENCY 
O’Hara (1997, p. 153) explains that new information becomes incorporated into securities 
prices due to the trading behaviour of informed and uninformed traders. Yet, price adjustment 
is not instantaneous – as prices are conditional expected values, the price at each point reflects 
all public information, but not necessarily all private information. This is because of the 
inhibiting effects of noise traders and limits to arbitrage on the informed traders’ ability to 
reflect their private information in prices. Until prices adjust to the new, full-information 
values, informed traders earn a return on their information and prices are only semi-strong form 
efficient.  
The antecedent piece to the microstructure literature was Working (1960), who documented 
that the use of time-averaged security prices could induce autocorrelation into returns series 
(Dimson & Mussavian, 1998). This issue of time-averaging was the first research on thin 
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trading. One of the earliest writings on market microstructure was Jack Treynor’s article on the 
adverse selection costs imposed by informed traders on the general investor population, written 
under the pseudonym of Bagehot (1971). The market-maker loses when trading with informed 
investors, but more than makes up for this loss by charging a ‘spread’ between the bid price - 
the price at which the dealer purchases a share - and the ask/ offer price - the price at which the 
dealer is willing to sell the share (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). Thus the dealer’s loss is actually 
borne by the uninformed investors who trade with him, and whom most likely constitute the 
majority of the investor population. This idea provided early understanding of how stock 
market efficiency is affected by the structure of the market, and the way in which investors’ 
trading impounds information into stock prices. Kyle (1985) formalised the Bagehot (1971) 
idea into a price formation model in which the transactions of a single informed trader result 
in only a slow incorporation of his superior knowledge into stock prices, due to the noise 
created by the uninformed traders. Because the market maker is unable to discriminate between 
order flow that is produced by informed traders and by noise traders, it sets prices that are 
increasing in the order flow imbalance which may imply informed trading. The consequence 
is a positive relation between the order flow and price changes. Poterba and Summers (1988) 
noted that the tendency of stock prices to show long-term mean reversion can be explained by 
the impact of uninformed noise traders on stock prices, and is suggestive of a market 
inefficiency. 
A fascinating insight discussed in Bernstein (1987) and theoretically derived in Campbell and 
Kyle (1993) is the somewhat contradictory role of noise traders in markets. On one hand, noise 
traders represent the other side of the transaction for information traders. Information traders 
are reluctant to trade with one another for fear of adverse selection. The economic function of 
noise traders is to make trade and therefore price formation possible. On the other hand, noise 
traders by definition act on imperfect information and can push company stock prices away 
from fundamental values. Herein lies the essentiality of the information trader’s role: attracted 
by the mispricing created by noise traders, the information trader will exploit such mispricing 
to bring prices back to fundamental values. Black (1986, p. 532) summarises the paradox: 
‘Noise trading actually puts noise into prices… Prices will be less efficient. What’s needed for 
a liquid market causes prices to be less efficient’. Noise makes financial markets possible, but 
also makes them imperfect.   
The ability of informed traders to profit from the mispricing induced by noise traders is referred 
to as incomplete arbitrage. It is noted that this terminology is not in harmony with the 
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conventional meaning of ‘arbitrage’, as taking two offsetting market positions in order to earn 
a riskless profit; it describes the exploitation of any mispricing, which cannot be perfectly 
hedged and will most likely expose the arbitrageur to some risk (McClelland, 2014). The 
efficiency of a securities market depends largely on the reliability of arbitrage in exploiting 
mispricing, thereby eliminating predictability in security returns and/ or bringing prices to 
fundamental values. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) study, ‘The Limits of Arbitrage’, focusses 
on the operational obstacles to arbitrage as well as the pattern of investor sentiment that can 
allow stock return predictability and pricing anomalies to thrive in a market. Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) suggest that market illiquidity is a barrier to the extensiveness and 
effectiveness of arbitrage. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that perfectly competitive 
markets are impossible when arbitrage is costly, because if all arbitrage profits are eliminated, 
there is no incentive for informed traders to incur the cost of arbitrage. The model proposed in 
their paper envisions an ‘equilibrium’ in which prices only partially reflect the information of 
informed traders, so that there is incentive to collect costly information. However, when 
information is costless and equilibrium prevails, prices reflect the information of the informed 
traders. But because traders have almost homogenous beliefs, the market is likely to be illiquid. 
This conundrum beguiles one to explore how market efficiency, in the spirit of both Fama 
(1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003), is related to market liquidity. Serially correlated noise in 
security returns is a feature of deviations from a random walk, but could also convey the 
amount of private information about fundamentals incorporated into prices, or the 
informational efficiency of the market. How these alternate metrics of financial market 
efficiency interact with market liquidity is an interesting problem that can further the search 
for common ground between Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003). 
 
2.2  THE LIQUIDITY LITERATURE 
It can be argued that the powerful role of individual asset or broad capital market liquidity in 
investment theory did not receive due attention in early theses and empirical research. 
However, in recent decades, the two questions of how liquidity informs asset pricing, and how 
it affects efficient price formation, has piqued the interest of academics. It is important to make 
a distinction between these two separate, but related, lines of research. 
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2.2.1 LITERATURE ON LIQUIDITY AS A PRICED SOURCE OF RISK 
Liquidity describes the ability to trade sufficient quantities of an asset quickly, at low cost, with 
minimal price impact (Liu, 2006). Intuitively, a low-liquidity stock would most likely be small, 
value, high bid-ask spread, low turnover or trading volume, and would suffer significant price 
impact when substantial trades are executed. Investors would rationally require a premium for 
holding these stocks. Less liquid stocks are more difficult to trade and expose the investor to 
considerable ‘lock-in’ risk, especially if market-wide liquidity happens to dry up. 
Consequently, we would expect the liquidity premium to be more pronounced when the market 
as a whole is less liquid, and cyclically during times of recession. This was posited in Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003), who find there is a premium for high sensitivity to aggregate liquidity. 
Market-wide liquidity is therefore an important state variable for asset pricing.  
One of the first papers to examine the priced nature of illiquidity risk was Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986). The authors provided theoretical and empirical proof of the positive relation 
between (relative) bid-ask spreads and market-observed average returns, and that net of 
transaction costs, asset returns to holders increase with the spread. In addition, there is a 
clientele effect that is characterised by longer-horizon investors holding stocks with higher 
spreads, which causes returns on higher-spread stocks to be less spread-sensitive. Importantly, 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) note that they do not consider their results to be indicative of a 
market inefficiency, but of a rational response by investors in an efficient market when faced 
with trading friction and costs.  
Amihud (2002) explores the relationship between expected stock return and expected stock 
illiquidity using the average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume as an illiquidity 
indicator. This measure emphasises the price impact dimension of illiquidity. It is shown that 
expected stock returns increase with expected illiquidity, both in the cross-section and across 
time. The results also indicate that ex ante stock excess return is an increasing function of 
expected market illiquidity, and innovations in market illiquidity lower contemporaneous stock 
prices.  
A formal Liquidity-Augmented Capital Asset Pricing Model was developed in Liu (2006), with 
two factors (market and liquidity) explaining the cross-section of stock returns for a sample of 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks over the period 1960-2003. The multidimensionality of 
liquidity is accounted for through a single measure that captures the speed, quantity, costs and 
price impact of trading. The model captures a significant liquidity premium robust to the 
14 | P a g e  
 
CAPM and the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model, and subsumes the size and value 
effects. Liu’s (2006) mimicking liquidity factor is negatively correlated with the market, 
confirming the conjecture that the premium required for holding low-liquidity stocks is greater 
during recessionary periods. The mimicking liquidity factor is significantly correlated with 
innovations in the market-wide liquidity measure that seems to describe aggregate market 
liquidity conditions.  
Prior to Liu (2006), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) independently derived their own Liquidity-
Augmented Capital Asset Pricing Model using the Amihud (2002) return-to-volume measure 
of illiquidity risk, and find that when testing the cross-sectional predictions of the model, it is 
able to capture the size effect but not the book-to-market effect. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
also find evidence consistent with ‘flight to liquidity’ when aggregate liquidity is low: less-
liquid stocks tend to have high commonality in liquidity with market liquidity, high return 
sensitivity to market liquidity, and high liquidity sensitivity to market returns. These three 
channels of liquidity risk differ in their respective contributions to the effect of liquidity on 
asset prices. The authors emphasise the importance of stock liquidity sensitivity to the market 
return – this element contributes to the majority of the estimated liquidity risk premium. They 
also conclude that the effects of liquidity level and liquidity risk are separate.  
Equilibrium asset-pricing models are by nature simplifications of reality, based on underlying 
assumptions such as perfect capital markets and an absence of trading frictions. Most of the 
extant asset-pricing literature abstracts from the features of the markets in which assets trade. 
The market microstructure literature, by contrast, centralises the mechanics of the trading 
process in affecting price formation and how information is incorporated into prices (Easley, 
Hvidkjaer & O’Hara, 2002). While an analysis of microstructural models of price efficiency, 
volatility, and the extent of private information is beyond the scope of this research (see O’Hara 
(1997) for a discussion and derivation of microstructure models), it is worth noting that the 
reliance of traditional asset-pricing models on prices being set ‘efficiently’ ignores the dynamic 
nature of efficiency. In a static-efficiency world, information is instantly reflected in the 
prevailing asset price, without conceptualising how information comes to be reflected in the 
price. If prices are continually revised to incorporate new information, then efficiency is a 
process, and how asset prices become efficient cannot be separated from asset returns at any 
point in time (Easley, Hvidkjaer & O’Hara, 2002).  
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Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) draw on market microstructure theory to show that there 
is a significant return premium associated with both the fixed and variable components of the 
cost of transacting. Monthly stock returns are significantly related to measures of illiquidity 
obtained from intraday transactions data, after adjusting for the Fama and French (1993) risk 
factors and after accounting for the effects of the stock price level. They reason that the primary 
cause of illiquidity in financial markets is the adverse selection costs arising from the existence 
of information asymmetry, and this significantly affects expected asset returns. 
It is almost instinctive to think of transactions costs and liquidity in the context of the repeated 
trading of a single homogenous asset. But the broader market determinants of liquidity, beyond 
that of individual assets, may have implications for microstructure theory as well as for 
investors and regulators. There is covariation in liquidity and associated co-movements in some 
component of transactions costs through time. Liquidity, trading costs and other microstructure 
phenomena have common underlying determinants (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2000; 
Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001). Huberman and Halka (2001) surmise that a systematic component 
of the temporal variation in liquidity may be created by the presence and effect of noise traders. 
Commonality in liquidity offers economic reasoning on liquidity risk in asset pricing (Liu, 
2006), as varying sensitivities to covariation in trading costs leaves certain assets more 
vulnerable to broad liquidity shocks. This would represent a source of non-diversifiable priced 
risk. Additionally, as advanced in Chordia et al. (2000, p. 3), ‘Recognising the existence of 
commonality is a key to uncovering some suggestive evidence that inventory risks and 
asymmetric information both affect intertemporal changes in [individual stock] liquidity’.  
 
2.2.2 LIQUIDITY, PRICE DISCOVERY AND PRICE FORMATION 
A fair market price is one that mirrors the demand propensities of all traders, unembroidered 
by incomplete information, unperturbed by shocks to the order flow, unobscured by periods of 
market thinness, and unaffected by the market trading system (Schreiber & Schwartz, 1986, p. 
43). John Maynard Keynes (1936, p. 103), in his well-known beauty contest analogy of 
securities markets, concludes that securities trading is an art of ‘anticipating what average 
opinion expects the average opinion to be’. Market prices are driven by the average of 
heterogeneous expectations and the trading propensities of the investor population. The 
effectiveness of security prices in reflecting the average opinion is the essence of price 
discovery in securities markets. Price changes are influenced by market mechanics - factors 
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such as the bid-ask spread, thin trading, and market maker intervention – as well as the 
information processing or price discovery of market participants (Schreiber & Schwartz, 1986). 
Price discovery and thus price adjustment is not immediate, and noise obfuscates the 
informational content of prices – leaving short-horizon asset returns to be serially dependent 
and short-horizon return variance to be higher relative to longer horizons.  
2.2.2.1  LIQUIDITY AND RETURN PREDICTABILITY  
Market microstructure theory qualifies the volume dimension of stock market liquidity in terms 
of depth, breadth and resiliency (Bernstein, 1987; Kyle, 1985). The amalgamation of these in 
a market is not an end in itself; but prompts information traders to trade on the inefficiencies 
created by noise traders. It is the noise trader who provides the depth, breadth and resiliency 
that make it possible for trade to occur. Depth and breadth describe the ease with which a large 
number of trades can be executed within a short period of time. Breadth refers to the existence 
of orders in ample volume, and depth typifies the existence of orders on both sides of the book 
close to the current trading prices of stocks (Hasbrouck & Schwartz, 1988). A resilient market 
is one with a large ‘countervailing order flow whenever transaction prices change because of 
temporary order imbalances’ (Garbade, 1982, p. 428).  
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) documented a significant predictability of daily 
market-wide order imbalances (defined as aggregate daily purchase orders less sell orders). A 
high aggregate buy-side imbalance on one day is likely to be followed by several more days of 
buy-side imbalance, and likewise for a high initial sell-side imbalance. This pattern of extended 
buying or selling can be interpreted as either due to herding behaviour or splitting large orders 
across days, or both. In two extended papers, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) and Chordia, 
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005) confirm this positive dependency in daily order imbalances 
and further note that these imbalances predict future short-horizon stock returns. The 2005 
paper also shows a negative serial dependence in returns over ten-minute intervals, conditional 
on the current order imbalance. Because only the market maker has absolute knowledge of 
order imbalances, this suggests that the market maker controls its inventory risk by adjusting 
quotes away from fundamentals (Amihud & Mendelson, 1980; Amihud & Mendelson, 1982; 
Ho & Stoll, 1981). Countervailing traders quickly recognise the price pressures induced by 
order imbalances and step in to remove the patterns in no more than thirty minutes. The Chordia 
and Subrahmanyam (2004) empirical study supplements their intertemporal framework of how 
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prices react to imbalances when risk-averse market makers have to accommodate positively 
autocorrelated trader demands.  
Stock return predictability is not a necessary implication of an illiquid market (Kyle, 1985). 
Chordia et al. (2008) provide three competing theoretical arguments for how return 
predictability from order flows can emerge. In the first scenario, market makers are constrained 
in their risk-bearing capacity and/ or inventory financing. Positively autocorrelated order 
imbalances create price pressures that can lead to transient patterns, such as short-horizon 
predictability of returns from lagged order flows. The arbitrage trader, if able to take advantage 
of the pattern, will do so until it is eliminated. However, illiquidity may limit the pervasion and 
effectiveness of arbitrage trading. The second mechanism is a behavioural one inspired by the 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) behavioural model: if market makers react sub-optimally 
to the pattern of order flow, a mispricing would arise. Outside market participants would 
attempt to profit from this by trading on information about order flow. This imposes an adverse 
selection cost on the market maker; the market may be less liquid as a result, even if prices are 
theoretically more efficient because more information is impounded into them. In this case, 
increased efficiency is associated with less liquidity. Lastly, there may be no relation between 
illiquidity and return predictability from order flows, if market makers rationally absorb 
imbalances and rapidly update quotes without outsider assistance. Based on their analysis, 
Chordia et al. (2008) lean toward the first hypothesis.  
Chung and Hrazdil (2010) conduct the Chordia et al. (2008) analyses on a more comprehensive 
sample of NYSE shares to examine potential confounding effects of trading frequency and firm 
size on the liquidity-efficiency relation. Unlike Chordia et al. (2008), whose study was 
restricted to only 193 large-capitalisation firms that traded every day during 1993-2002, Chung 
and Hrazdil (2010) include all firms listed on the NYSE between 1993 and 2004. Although 
their results show a general improvement in efficiency for portfolios formed on trading 
frequency, volume, and market capitalisation, there is significant heterogeneity in short-
horizon return predictability from past order flows across portfolios. They advise that 
regression analyses in cross-sectional research studies control for trading frequency, volume 
and market capitalisation when performing market efficiency estimations. The authors further 
extend the liquidity and information effects analysed in Chordia et al. (2008) by asking whether 
and to what degree these effects drive the cross-sectional variations in short-horizon return 
predictability. They do this by adopting a two-stage regression approach: in the first stage, they 
replicate the Chordia et al. (2008) methodology. In the second stage, they move away from the 
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portfolio approach and examine return predictability on a firm-level basis. They relate market 
efficiency to the effective bid-ask spread (twice the absolute difference between the transaction 
price and the midpoint between prevailing quoted prices), to further demonstrate how liquidity 
affects return predictability. Then, they identify phases of high adverse selection in the market 
and show how the liquidity and market efficiency dynamic changes during these informational 
periods. Overall, they support the Chordia et al. (2008) hypothesis that increased liquidity 
enhances market efficiency as it facilitates arbitrage activity, which helps the market maker 
absorb investor demand. They also confirm that past order flows contain public information 
about future returns, and that the convergence to market efficiency, or the time taken for prices 
to fully reflect new information, is not instantaneous (Chordia et al., 2005). There is an increase 
in return predictability when new information arrives, and the effect liquidity has on market 
efficiency is more pronounced during such informational periods. They conclude that increased 
liquidity encourages the price discovery process and a more efficient incorporation of 
information into prices by reducing the effect of asymmetric information on short-horizon 
market efficiency.  
 
2.2.2.2 LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY 
In addition to return predictability, financial market efficiency can be assessed using the 
variance or volatility of short-horizon returns relative to long-horizon volatility. Chordia et al. 
(2008) reasoned that because the long-horizon return variance should be q times the variance 
of short-horizon returns, where q is the number of short-horizon periods within the longer 
horizon, the scaled ratio of these values should converge to unity in large samples. A variance 
ratio significantly above unity implies that the trading process induces noise in stock returns. 
What is particularly interesting about testing for noise in security price returns is the continuum 
of interpretations it inspires. The lines between Fama’s (1970) market efficiency and Shiller’s 
(1981; 2003) market efficiency become somewhat blurred when comparing interpretations. 
Noise could indicate lack of conformity to a random walk price process. Deviations from 
random walks can materialise as return serial correlation is introduced through the inventory 
control activity of the market maker (Grossman & Miller, 1988; Madhavan, Richardson & 
Roomans, 1997), or because uninformed trade is not independent and identically distributed 
(Easley, Kiefer & O’Hara, 1997). In Black’s (1986, p.529) model of financial markets, noise 
is contrasted with information: ‘[Noise] is what makes our observations imperfect. It keeps us 
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from knowing the expected return on a stock or portfolio’. Noise causes the short-term 
volatility of price to be greater than the short-term volatility of value. The variances will 
converge over longer intervals. Clearly, the influence of noise signifies a violation of both 
Fama’s (1970) and Shiller’s (1981; 2003) versions of efficiency. The crucial difference is what 
each scenario implies for financial market liquidity. Liquidity should be associated with 
enhanced efficiency if it eases the elimination of return predictability and a restoration of 
random walk benchmarks (Chordia et al., 2008). Conversely, in Black’s (1986) model, noise 
trading is associated with increased liquidity as noise traders represent the other side of the 
transaction for information traders, but prices are less efficient as the value of information 
reflected in them is obscured by noise. Thus, an analysis of the noise in stock returns across 
liquidity states can provide insight into how noise interacts with market liquidity.  
Black (1986) goes on further that noise will only permeate prices when noise traders trade, and 
information traders trade more with noise traders than they do with one another. The result is 
that prices will not move as much when the market is closed as when it is open. This increase 
in stock return volatility during market trading hours is precisely what French and Roll (1986) 
found in their study of information processing in financial markets. Although around 4-12% of 
the daily variance is due to pricing errors, they ascribe high trading-time variances principally 
to private information which affects prices when informed traders trade. Thus, the behaviour 
of returns during trading hours is linked to informational efficiency in the spirit of Kyle (1985). 
Chordia et al. (2008) use this measure of trading-time versus non-trading time variances across 
liquidity regimes to discern whether higher liquidity aids privately informed trading and thus 
an increased incorporation of information into prices when the market is open. They show that 
this ratio increases over time, and consider first-order daily return autocorrelations to 
discriminate between the mispricing and the private information hypotheses. French and Roll 
(1986) conjecture that significant autocorrelation suggests mispricing either due to investors’ 
reaction biases or microstructural frictions. Although Chordia et al. (2008) provide evidence 
of positive autocorrelations, there is no evidence that autocorrelations increased along with 
trading-time volatility. Thus the observed increase in trading-time variance is not due to 
increased mispricing, but the more effective incorporation of private information into prices 
when informed traders find it more profitable to trade as transaction costs are lower.  
Chung and Hrazdil (2010) take a different approach in evaluating how liquidity assists the 
incorporation of information into prices. They identify ‘informational periods’ as those when 
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is relatively higher (Glosten & Milgrom, 
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1985), and find that during such periods, the positive effect of liquidity on market efficiency is 
significantly more pronounced. Therefore the degree to which prices incorporate information 
depends on market liquidity. 
Fleming and Remolona (1999) study price formation and liquidity in the U.S. Treasury market. 
They identify a two-stage adjustment process for prices, trading volume and bid-ask spreads 
upon the arrival of public information. The first stage sees a sharp and almost instantaneous 
price change with a reduction in trading volume when major macroeconomic news is released. 
The inventory control concerns of the market maker induce a widening of spreads and a marked 
disruption of liquidity. In a prolonged second stage, trading volume increases dramatically, 
price volatility persists, and spreads remain wide due to the role of differential private 
information. The reconciliation of divergent views is a protracted process: He and Wang’s 
(1995) model of investors with differential information results in persistence in price volatility 
and trading volume in a slow convergence to a consensus price. The noise in prices obscures 
the revelation of traders’ private information, facilitating persistence in volume and volatility.  
 
2.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE 
 
2.3.1 THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE: EVOLUTION OF A 
TRADING SYSTEM 
Market frictions are a reality of most, if not all, trading systems. The efficiency of market 
outcomes such as price and trade determination then hinges in some manner on the design 
features of the market (Schreiber & Schwartz, 1986). Trade in financial assets has increasingly 
become a game of speed. Stoll’s (2006) view is that electronic trading enhances market 
efficiency by decreasing the cost of providing liquidity, and ensuring faster trading and more 
accurate price signals. 
A stream of empirical literature has emerged, aimed at identifying exogenous changes in 
market structure that encourage high-frequency activity, and the consequences thereof 
(Hendershott, Jones & Menkveld, 2011; Menkveld, 2013; Riordan & Storkenmaier, 2012). 
Conrad, Wahal and Xiang (2015) focus on the influence of high-frequency quoting on market 
efficiency and price formation in the case of an exogenous technological upgrade to the trading 
system of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They find that prices more closely resembled a random 
walk and that trading costs declined sharply when the new system was implemented. Boehmer, 
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Fong and Wu (2012), using an international sample spanning the period 2001-2009, conclude 
that algorithmic trading intensity enhances liquidity and informational efficiency, while also 
increasing volatility. 
Formed in 1887, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is one of the largest exchanges in the 
world by market capitalisation (World Federation of Exchanges, 2013), and is certainly the 
largest exchange in Africa. South Africa’s capital markets are mature even by developed 
market standards, serving economies in the local sphere and the broader African continent. Size 
and scale do not however equate to market liquidity. The speed, ease and cost effectiveness of 
entering and exiting a position would be a primary element in determining the attractiveness 
of a marketplace to both domestic and international investors. Globalization of real and 
financial markets has amassed a legion of international traders in search of opportunities in 
foreign markets. International investors would be especially attracted to a liquid market through 
the assurance of easy access and speedy exit. Furthermore, the ability to profit from observed 
inefficiencies for any significantly-sized portfolio would be hampered by illiquidity, resulting 
in persistent market anomalies (Bailey & Gilbert, 2007). Institutional investors would find it 
particularly difficult to invest large sums into a market when its available liquidity constrains 
the number of shares that could be bought or sold at certain prices.  
A 1994 report by a JSE-appointed research sub-committee on the future structure of the JSE 
concluded that liquidity on the JSE, as defined by annual turnover as a percentage of market 
capitalisation, was unsatisfactorily low (Katz, 1994). Measures to improve liquidity include 
increasing the volume of trade; improved information disclosure; and changes to the system of 
trade (De Villiers, 1996).  
Today, the JSE looks very different. This change has transpired through structural forces such 
as a higher volume of trade, due to greater participation from local and international investors 
and enhanced information dissemination, and improvements to the system of trade. 
The increase in volume of trade can be ascribed to changes in tax rules and methods to 
encourage firm disclosure of information. The 1997 launch of the Stock Exchange News 
Service (SENS) represented an important breakthrough in information dissemination and 
transparency for the South African market, heightening investor confidence. The service 
distributes news of corporate announcements and price-sensitive information in real time.  
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The JSE continues to make improvements to the efficiency and speed of the trading, clearing 
and settlement processes through changes to the market microstructure. The year 1996 marked 
the end of 108 years of open-outcry floor trading. All trade was moved to an automated, order-
driven, central trading platform, the Johannesburg Equities Trading (JET) system. Dual trading 
and negotiated brokerage commissions were also introduced (JSE, 2015b). A second milestone 
in the technological revolution was the introduction in 1997 of Shares Transactions Totally 
Electronic (Strate), the electronic clearing and settlement concept. The JSE experienced a boost 
in trading volumes upon adoption of the JSE SETS trading platform in 2002, and again when 
the JSE TradElect system, licensed from the London Stock Exchange, was implemented in 
2007. In July 2012, the JSE launched the equity trading platform Millennium Exchange, 
enabling the execution of transactions at speeds almost 400 times faster than the previous 
trading solution. The adoption was expected to increase trading volumes as it facilitates a 
proliferation of high-frequency and algorithmic trading activity, and thus higher market 
liquidity. Indeed, this effect was inferred in Hattingh (2014). Increases in trading speeds led to 
a rise in levels of trading and depth of the market (JSE, 2011).  
Concomitant to the 2012 revamp was the move of the trading engine from London to the JSE 
building in Johannesburg. The relocation eliminated certain operational problems related to 
international connectivity links that often resulted in a halt in trading (JSE, 2011). A strong 
statistical relationship between algorithmic trading and a change in JSE market structure was 
found in Zito (2014), with mixed evidence of a positive effect on liquidity with a corresponding 
increase in volatility and decrease in the average trade size. The launch of the JSE’s colocation 
facilities on 12 May 2014 (JSE, 2014) further advanced the speed of market access, boosting 
liquidity and transparency (Jain, 2005; Zito, 2014). The colocation centre allows clients to 
place their trading equipment in closer proximity to the trading systems of the JSE markets 
(JSE, 2013), providing faster access to the market and greater ability to take advantage of 
market movements. Colocation services clearly improve trading speeds and updates to market 
data, which enhance response to market movements and deployment of new trading strategies 
(JSE, 2014).  
Improved efficiency, service and stability has solidified the status of the South African market 
as a world-class exchange, and a prime trading environment attracting the interest of domestic 
and international market players alike.  
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2.3.2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF JSE STOCK RETURN DATA 
First-order return autocorrelations are, in general, very close to zero for actively traded stocks 
in developed markets. The Chordia et al. (2005) study exhibited that, despite persistence in the 
order imbalance, the S&P500 index is virtually a random walk over daily horizons. As the 
present research is an adaptation of the Chordia et al. (2005; 2008) methodologies to the smaller 
South African market, the local market’s idiosyncrasies must be known and understood (Page, 
Britten & Auret, 2016). The JSE is an innately different market to the U.S. exchanges, and the 
South African literature is far from settled on the weak-form efficiency of the JSE. 
Gilbertson and Roux (1977) presented a case for the efficiency of the JSE by remarking that, 
despite evidence of serial dependence in share returns, these are too small to be exploited. 
However, Strebel (1977) argued that the EMH is true only for the highest-volume shares listed 
on the JSE. Thompson and Ward (1995) reviewed the early tests of the i.i.d. random walk 
hypothesis on the JSE. The overall evidence was mixed, due to methodological differences in 
empirical tests of the efficiency of the JSE. Smith, Jefferis and Ryoo (2002) found that the JSE 
followed an i.i.d. random walk. Larger-capitalisation, liquid stocks are more likely to follow 
random walks than small, illiquid stocks (Jefferis & Smith, 2004). Smith (2008) conducted 
rigorous tests of the i.i.d. random walk and martingale hypotheses with weekly and monthly 
data for 11 African stock market price indices using joint variance ratio tests. For both the 
monthly and weekly return series, the author finds that the JSE All Share Index does not follow 
an i.i.d. random walk. However, returns are a martingale difference sequence – they are not 
predictable, but may contain dependence in higher moments, for example, conditional 
heteroscedasticity. Additionally, Smith (2008) concludes that the differing results for the 
various African exchanges indicate that market liquidity is an influencing factor on whether 
the market index follows a martingale difference sequence.  
Most studies focus on linear serial dependence when testing stock return predictability. Higher-
order serial dependence indicates nonlinear behaviour of share returns. Research such as that 
of McMillan (2004) suggests the existence of higher-order processes in the return-generating 
process, and due to the interaction between noise and arbitrage traders, a different treatment 
for large and small share returns is necessary. The results of Mangani (2007) showed significant 
nonlinear dependence in the returns of a sample of 42 JSE stocks, implying nonlinear 
predictability in the returns. Using daily data on the JSE All Share Index over 1995-2010, 
Babikir, Gupta, Mwabutwa and Owusu-Sekyere (2012) find no evidence of autocorrelation of 
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daily stock returns based on closing prices. However, they do find strong serial correlations in 
the squared stock returns. Kruger, Toerien and MacDonald (2012) found nonlinear serial 
dependence in daily share price data for the JSE’s All-Share Index constituents, using a battery 
of tests for nonlinear behaviour. Nonlinear behaviour in share returns could have a multitude 
of causes, which are not mutually exclusive. Examples include: challenges posed to arbitrage 
such as thin trading, transaction costs, and regulatory constraints; nonlinear feedback 
mechanisms in price movements; and irrational investor behaviour (Antoniou, Ergul & 
Holmes, 1997). Although significant linear and nonlinear serial dependencies were found for 
all shares examined in Kruger et al. (2012), these incidences are sporadic and transient in 
nature, rendering them difficult to predict and exploit over time. Thus the authors conclude that 
the JSE is efficient for most of the sample period investigated, interspersed with only brief 
periods of inefficiency characterised by serial return dependence. A similar conclusion on the 
weak-form efficiency of 10 Asian emerging stock markets was reached by Lim, Brooks and 
Hinich (2008).  
Unterhorst (2014) presented empirical evidence of asymmetric reverting behaviour in the 
conditional mean and conditional variance of stock returns on the JSE. The effect is most acute 
over daily and weekly intervals. Conditional mean asymmetry describes the nonlinear reverting 
patterns of returns: negative returns revert faster and with greater magnitude to positive returns 
than positive returns revert to negative returns; causing persistence of positive returns through 
time (Nam, 2003). Unterhorst’s (2014) results show signs of this positive-return persistence in 
the daily return series across market capitalisation and industry, supporting the profitability of 
short-run contrarian trading strategies. The finding of positive-return persistence is aligned 
with Chordia et al. (2002), who express the idea that price pressure is not a phenomenon limited 
to individual stocks, but also impacts returns at the aggregate market level. 
Cubbins, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert (2006) detected the presence of mean reversion of share 
returns on the JSE. This finding prompted Bailey and Gilbert (2007) to suggest that the market 
is not entirely efficient, and that the persistence of the anomaly is caused by illiquidity, which 
hampers the ability to profit from observed inefficiencies. Due to the exacerbation of the price 
impact effect for larger portfolios, institutional investors’ actions impact the prices at which 
they can actually trade in the market. The authors went on to test for the effects of liquidity on 
mean reversion by modifying the Cubbins et al. (2006) methodology to include a liquidity cap 
measure as a liquidity constraint from the perspective of a fund manager. Their results indicate 
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that liquidity has an asymmetrical effect on the abnormal returns achievable through mean 
reversion of share returns for low-P/E versus high-P/E shares. 
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3 METHODOLOGY (RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS) 
 
3.1 TIME-SERIES TESTS OF ORDER IMBALANCES AND RETURNS 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005) provide evidence of short-horizon return 
predictability from lagged order flow data. This relation is confirmed in Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008), which also documents that the phenomenon dissipates during more 
liquid states of the market. The authors conjecture that liquidity facilitates arbitrage trading due 
to a reduction in the effective costs of trading.  
As a first step, the Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) study demarcated its investigation 
of the liquidity-efficiency relation in the context of intraday trading. This implicitly assumes 
that the market studied was approximately efficient over a daily horizon, but that inefficiencies 
may arise during intraday trading. Returns and order flows were measured over an intraday 
interval of five minutes in the 2008 paper, a choice made to strike a balance between potential 
nontrading issues and the preservation of the integrity of the research. The authors’ reason that 
since the predictability of returns from lagged order imbalances is not likely to survive for very 
long, using longer intervals may result in important patterns and short-lived market 
inefficiencies going undetected. 
The first set of testing in this study involved an investigation of the relation between liquidity 
and the efficiency-creating process by focussing on return predictability in daily data. The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, at the time of writing, did not record high-frequency 
transactions data in a readily-accessible database such as the NYSE’s Trade and Automated 
Quotations (TAQ) database. This means that, although the JSE was able to provide trading 
prices at fifteen-minute frequencies, it was not feasible to extract the associated bid and offer 
quotes at the same frequencies. Best bid or offer (BBO) quote data, as used in Chordia, Roll 
and Subrahmanyam (2001), were only available at a daily interval. As bid and offer quote data 
are essential to the calculation of order imbalances, the research methodology settled for the 
highest-frequency interval possible. Note that the terms ‘offer quote’ and ‘ask quote’ will be 
used interchangeably in this study, as both refer to the price at which a market maker is willing 
to sell a security. 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) documented a positive autocorrelation in daily order 
imbalances, as well as a positive predictive relationship running from lagged (by one day) 
imbalances to current day returns. They interpret their findings as supportive of the notion that 
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inventory effects last for time intervals longer than a trading day. Additionally, the abundant 
evidence for nonlinear serial price dependencies in the South African market (Babikir et al., 
2012; Kruger et al., 2012; Mangani, 2007; McMillan, 2004; Unterhorst, 2014) provides 
assurance that transient incidences of market inefficiency may well still be detected at a daily 
horizon. Moreover, correspondence with Richard Roll, a co-author of the Chordia et al. (2008) 
paper, indicates that longer intervals may be acceptable for a developing market that is not very 
liquid or active. Future research should extend the methodology explored in this study as the 
JSE’s technological capabilities continue to advance, not only in terms of microstructural 
developments, but also improvements in record-keeping and data-collection processes. 
Clearly, the concept of an order imbalance over a time horizon has meaning only in an 
intermediated-market context, wherein market makers accommodate the demand and supply 
needs of outside investors. In any other paradigm, order imbalances would be deemed 
irrelevant by the classic notion of “for every buyer, there’s a seller” (Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam, 2004). 
When trading is infrequent, it becomes difficult to evaluate share return behaviour; in 
particular, the measurement of serial dependence at short horizons. Chordia et al. (2008) 
alleviated potential problems due to thin trading by excluding small stocks from their analysis. 
The share sample in this study was selected from the Top 40 constituents listed on the JSE, due 
to their large market capitalisations and the high likelihood that they traded every day over the 
time period studied. Of the current Top 40, 28 shares have been present in the index at least 
since the 1996 move to electronic trading, and these form the final share sample analysed in 
this study. The sample period studied is January 2012 – June 2016 as it covers a time of 
important exogenous change in the market microstructure of the exchange. Specifically, the 
year 2012 marked the implementation of the Millennium Exchange trading platform, an 
electronic trading system much faster and more efficient than any platform before it. The 
advancement in market microstructure represents a structural break to discern the relation 
between market liquidity and efficiency. Zito (2014) found a strong positive statistical 
relationship between the introduction of the Millennium Exchange platform in 2012 and the 
proliferation of algorithmic trading (AT) in the market. AT activity grew by 24% when 
comparing the first five week period to the last five week period studied after the 
implementation of the new trading platform. The increase in AT activity owing to a change in 
the market microstructure is in line with international theory (Hendershott et al., 2011). Due to 
data availability constraints, the time period spanning the previous trading platform upgrades 
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could not be analysed in this study. Future research should incorporate these important periods 
as the data become available.  
The order imbalance for a stock over a time interval is calculated as the Rands paid by buyer-
initiators less the Rands received by seller-initiators divided by the total Rand value of trading 
(OIBR):  
 
OIBRt = 
(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟−𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡)−(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟−𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡
                           (1) 
 
Chordia et al. (2008) conduct their return predictability regressions using two alternate 
measures of order imbalance: OIB$ (analogous to OIBR in this study), as well as OIB#, the 
number of buyer- less the number of seller-initiated trades divided by the total number of trades. 
OIB# weighs all orders equally, irrespective of size. Large orders will be weighted more 
heavily when using OIBR – providing the economic magnitude of the order imbalance. As the 
results of Chordia et al. (2008) are directionally consistent using either measure of order 
imbalance, this study uses OIBR only for brevity.  
The computation process begins with the transactions and bid-offer quote data. After filtering 
the trade and quote data for out-of-sequence trades, each transaction was matched to a bid-ask 
quote. This entails setting the matching quote to be the first quote prior to the trade. Chordia et 
al. (2008) set the matching quote to be the first quote at least five seconds before the trade. 
However, due to a general decrease in reporting errors after 1998, the matching quote is simply 
the first quote prior to the trade. 
Following Chordia et al. (2008), the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm was applied to the 
matched trade-quote data to obtain an estimate of whether a particular trade was buyer- or 
seller-initiated. The logic behind the Lee-Ready classification is quite intuitive: it assigns a 
trade as buyer- (seller-) initiated if it is closer to the offer (bid) of the prevailing quote. If the 
trade price is exactly at the midpoint of the quoted spread, the trade is classified as buyer- 
(seller-) initiated if the last price change prior to the trade is positive (negative). It was then 
straightforward to calculate the daily order imbalance for a stock. Order imbalances were 
computed over all trades for each trading day examined.  
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Daily returns can be obtained through several methods. Returns computation using transaction 
prices is commonly accepted practice in finance, but such returns are affected by bid-ask 
bounce (Chordia et al., 2008). Following Chordia et al. (2008), share returns were computed 
using the midpoints of the bid and offer quotes prevailing at the end of each trading day: 
 
Returnit = ln ( 
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡−1
  )                                                           (2)                                                                                                                               
 
3.2 LIQUIDITY DATA 
Chordia et al. (2008) measure market-wide illiquidity by calculating the mean bid-offer spread 
for each individual firm over each trading day. The use of the bid-offer spread as a measure of 
aggregate illiquidity is appropriate in the context of that paper, given that the structural breaks 
identified (reductions in the minimum tick size) would affect bid-offer spreads, or the 
transaction costs related to trading. However, the same reasoning cannot be applied in the 
context of this study, as it is not immediately obvious whether technological trading platform 
upgrades would affect individual firm bid-offer spreads. The likely liquidity outcome of faster, 
more efficient channels of trading would be most palpable when measuring turnover, or the 
trading quantity dimension of liquidity. Daily share turnover is defined as daily trading volume 
divided by number of issued shares outstanding: 
 
Turnoverit = 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
                                                                                    (3) 
 
The measure of market-wide liquidity in this study uses firm trading turnover over each trading 
day in the sample period. The aggregate liquidity indicator, Liqt, is derived by value-weighting 
and averaging daily turnover across stocks, with market capitalisations at the end of the 
previous year used to calculate weights: 
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Liqt =∑ 
(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)∗(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
                                                         (4)                                                                        
 
Structural breaks in the market’s trading processes logically should be linked to enhanced 
liquidity, which would be confirmed by time-series variations in the aggregate liquidity 
measure. Chordia et al. (2008) observed that when bid-ask spreads are narrower, short-horizon 
return predictability is diminished. Although the bid-ask spread is a widely used liquidity proxy 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2008; Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara 
& Paperman, 1996), it is a one-dimensional measure that only captures the facet of liquidity 
characterised by direct trading cost (Liu, 2006). Yet, the Amihud (2002) and Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) measures, that capture price reaction to trading volume, are not readily 
computable as daily measures (Chordia et al., 2008). These issues could be alleviated through 
the use of a liquidity indicator analogous to Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure, LMx, for the 
aggregate market. LMx is constructed as the standardised turnover-adjusted number of zero 
daily trading volumes over the prior x months. 
The advantage of using LMx is its ability to capture the multidimensional nature of liquidity, 
with an emphasis on the speed and continuity of trading, and the delay or difficulty of executing 
an order. Liu (2006) standardised the liquidity measure in order to compare the turnover-
adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes across one-, six- and twelve-month periods. As 
LMx is constructed using daily trading volume data, it should not be difficult to use the spirit 
of the measure to estimate changes in aggregate liquidity across stages in the structure of the 
trading environment. Unfortunately, as this study focuses on large-capitalisation JSE Top 40 
shares, which were chosen based on the fact that they traded every day during the sample period 
– and thus have no or very few days of zero trading volumes – LMx would not meaningfully 
quantify how liquidity dynamics of the aggregate (Top 40) market have changed over time. 
Future research methodologies should extend this study to examine a more comprehensive 
sample, covering a range of firm sizes, trading frequencies and volumes. This would make the 
use of a measure such as LMx more insightful of the overall JSE market trading frequency, as 
more infrequently-traded shares would be included. 
The technological advancement in market microstructure provides a natural experimental 
setting to test the impact of exogenous liquidity changes on return predictability. Three distinct 
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liquidity regimes should be identifiable: (1) the six-month period prior to 2 July 2012, when 
all trade moved to the Millennium Exchange platform; (2) the period from 2 July 2012 to 12 
May 2014, the date of the launch of the JSE’s colocation centre; and (3) the period from 12 
May 2014 to June 2016. The Liq aggregate liquidity measure, defined in equation (4) above, 
was used to identify exogenous changes in market liquidity during the three regimes. 
 
3.3 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION AND REGRESSION EVIDENCE 
The portfolio of 28 large-capitalisation JSE shares is constructed on a value-weighted basis, in 
order to calculate portfolio returns. In other words, the portfolio weight attached to each stock 
is calculated using its firm market capitalisation at the end of the previous year, as a percentage 
of the total market capitalisation of the share sample. The portfolio was not rebalanced across 
time, as the constituent shares were selected based on the fact that they traded every day during 
the sample period, and they were attached portfolio weightings according to their market 
capitalisations. 
One technique to gauge a relation between returns and order imbalances is to compute 
correlation coefficients between daily returns and order imbalances across liquidity regimes. 
Note that this does not reveal any predictive relation between the two, and thus does not tell us 
how liquidity directly influences Fama’s (1970) market efficiency. Inspired by the 
methodology of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008), the liquidity-efficiency relation is 
tested directly using time-series regressions of daily portfolio returns on lagged order 
imbalances, over all days within a regime. 
 
Returnt = α + βt*OIBRt-1 + ɛt                                                                                                (5) 
 
Where Returnt is the day t return for the portfolio, and OIBRt-1 is the order imbalance measure 
defined above, lagged by one day. If the one-day lagged imbalance measure is a significant 
predictor of next-period returns (the coefficient, β1, is significant), this implies return 
predictability and thus a deviation from market efficiency.    
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To determine whether and how efficiency has evolved over time, predictive regressions were 
performed for each month over the sample. One could infer that the market has become more 
efficient if the time-series shows a decline in R2s and t-statistics for stock returns regressed on 
lagged order imbalances, across the three regimes.  
The effect of illiquidity on trading and arbitrage activity should be starker during abnormally 
illiquid days within a particular liquidity regime. This can be tested by using an explanatory 
variable in the regressions that interacts the one-day lagged order imbalance measure with a 
low-liquidity dummy which equals one on days of abnormally low liquidity, and zero 
otherwise. A day is categorised as low-liquidity if the linearly detrended liquidity indicator for 
that regime is at least one standard deviation below the expected liquidity indicator. 
 
Returnt = α + β1*OIBt-1 + β2*(OIBt-1*ILDt) + ɛt                                                                 (6) 
 
Where ILDt is the low-liquidity dummy and all other variables are as defined above. If the 
coefficient β2 on the interaction variable is significantly positive, this would suggest that the 
predictability of returns from lagged imbalances increases during illiquid periods. Moreover, 
intertemporal changes in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables would provide evidence of whether liquidity improves Fama’s (1970) market 
efficiency.  
A further technique used to interpret the possible relation between liquidity and Fama’s (1970) 
efficiency is the Chung and Hrazdil (2010) market efficiency regression. The regression 
equation (5) was estimated for each sample firm on a monthly basis, using the observations 
obtained over all days within the month. The resulting R2s can be interpreted as inverse 
measures of short-horizon market efficiency (MktEff). The relationship running between 
market efficiency (MktEff) and liquidity (Liq) can be estimated from the equation: 
 
MktEffi = α + β1*Regime1i + β2*Regime2i + β3*Regime3i + δ6Liqi + δ7SIZEi                    (7) 
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Equation (7) is a logit transformation of the MktEff measure, the R2 of each firm-month 
regression of equation (5), bounded by 0 and 1. Each Regime regressor is a binary variable that 
takes a value of one if the sample month falls within one of the liquidity regimes outlined in 
Section 3.2 above, and zero otherwise. Liqi represents the scaled liquidity measure for the firm, 
averaged across all trades. SIZE is the scaled market capitalisation of the firm at the end of the 
regression month.  
Lastly, Granger causality tests were conducted to understand if there is a causative relationship 
between aggregate liquidity and market efficiency. The regression of equation (5) was 
estimated for each month in the sample period, using all days within that month, and the 
imbalance coefficient was recorded. The daily liquidity indicator, aggregate turnover, was 
averaged over each month to arrive at a monthly measure. The series of imbalance coefficients 
and liquidity indicators were then tested for Granger causality. Before performing the Granger 
causality tests, the two data series were tested for stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
 
3.4 DEVIATIONS FROM RANDOM WALKS ACROSS LIQUIDITY 
ENVIRONMENTS 
In addition to stock return predictability from order flows, Fama’s (1970) financial market 
efficiency can be assessed through an analysis of deviations from a random walk benchmark. 
For a random walk price process, the variance of long-horizon returns is equal to the variance 
of short-horizon returns multiplied by the number of short intervals in the long horizon (Lo & 
MacKinlay, 1990). The comparison of short- and long-horizon variance ratios offers an 
approach to understanding market efficiency by measuring deviations from random walks.  
French and Roll (1986) contend that if returns are independent, the variance for a long holding 
period will equal the cumulated short-horizon variances within that period. This logic dictates 
that the ratio of the intraday interval variance multiplied by the number of intervals in a day, to 
the open-to-close midquote return variance of that particular trading day, should converge to 
one in large samples. Comparing variance ratios across liquidity regimes provides insight into 
how liquidity influences conformity of midquote prices to random walks. Variance ratios 
substantially above one are indicative of noise in stock prices. In contrast, increased mispricing 
in the form of persistent swings away from fundamental values or slow adjustments to shocks 
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could result in variance ratios falling below one (Conrad, Wahal & Xiang, 2015). If the ratio 
converges to unity over time, this would suggest that lack of return independence, and thus 
deviations from random walk benchmarks, is reduced in more liquid states of the market when 
trading is easier, faster and less costly.  
In obtaining portfolio variance ratios for each of the three liquidity regimes, the intraday price 
transaction data (at fifteen-minute intervals) were used to compute short-horizon return 
variances, which were compared to transaction price return variances from open-to-close of a 
trading day: 
 
Variance ratio = 
(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡−ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)∗(# 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛)
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔−ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
              (8)                                                                            
 
Variance ratios were averaged across shares in the portfolio (using market capitalisations at the 
end of the previous year to calculate weights) to obtain the portfolio variance ratios. As noted 
in Section 3.1, bid-offer quote data were not available at an intraday horizon. It is 
acknowledged that the use of trade prices exposes the calculation of return variances to 
inflation due to bid-ask bounce. However, what is relevant in determining deviations from 
random walks is not absolute values of return variance, but the ratio of short- to long-horizon 
return variances. Any variance exaggeration is, for the purposes of this analysis, not relevant. 
What is important is the preservation of consistency in the price convention (trade price versus 
midquote price) used to compute short-horizon and long-horizon return variances. 
 
3.5 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
Trading noise can signify deviations from random walks (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 
2008), but high trading-time volatility can be used as a suggestive measure of the amount of 
private information about fundamentals incorporated into prices. Ratios of (per-hour) open-to-
close to close-to-open return variances are a gauge of informational efficiency. Higher variance 
during market trading hours either signals mispricing or the incorporation of private 
information into prices through privately informed trading when the market is open (French & 
Roll, 1986). Each of these explanations has implications for the market efficiency case, in the 
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sense of both Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003). An analysis of per-hour variance ratios 
aims to discern whether open-close variances exceed close-open variances, and if so, how this 
changes across the three liquidity regimes and the possible drivers of the phenomenon. The 
per-hour variance ratios were obtained by first separating daily firm open-close and close-open 
returns, and calculating the raw variances of each over the three regimes. Then, the open-close 
raw variances were divided by the total number of calendar hours that the market was open 
during the relevant regime, and the same was done for the close-open raw variances (dividing 
by the total hours that the market was closed during the relevant regime). First-order daily 
return autocorrelations across liquidity regimes were used in attempting to distinguish between 
the mispricing and the informed trading arguments in French and Roll (1986). First-order 
autocorrelations in the squared daily returns were also calculated, given the evidence of 
nonlinear serial return dependence on the JSE (Babikir et al., 2012; Kruger et al., 2012; 
Mangani, 2007; McMillan, 2004; Unterhorst, 2014). Nonlinear serial return dependence can 
be determined by finding significant first-order autocorrelation in the squared daily return 
series of the portfolio.  
Significant autocorrelations are consistent with mispricing due to microstructural frictions or 
behavioural biases of investors when reacting to new information. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that mispricing drives the increase in variance ratios over time: one can only 
conclude that higher relative trading-time variances are a feature of mispricing if the absolute 
autocorrelations increase along with variance ratios through liquidity regimes. An increase in 
variance ratios coupled with a decrease in absolute first-order autocorrelations is suggestive of 
prices adjusting to information about fundamentals, as informed traders find it more 
worthwhile to transact based on their information when the market is more liquid, and trade is 
faster, easier and cheaper.  
The computation of open-to-close to close-to-open variance ratios makes use of transaction 
prices to determine return variances. Daily return autocorrelations are determined from end-of-
day midquote returns.   
 
 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics associated with the liquidity, imbalance and return measures 
for each of the liquidity regimes. The summary statistics are most striking in their incongruence 
to both the initial hypothesis of this study and to the results of Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008). While Chordia et al. (2008) report a sharp increase in liquidity 
(measured by trading cost) during their three regimes, the trend in liquidity on the JSE Top 40 
(measured by trading quantity) during 2012 - 2016 is much less apparent. The aggregate 
liquidity measure, Liq, was highest during the six months before the July 2012 platform 
upgrade, it fell during the almost two years following the upgrade, and it increased slightly 
during the last regime. Still, aggregate liquidity decreased during the third regime relative to 
the first regime. This finding is interesting, but contrary to the hypothesis that the structural 
breaks in the JSE’s market microstructure would result in a continuous increase in market 
liquidity. The result highlights the difficulty in isolating liquidity changes that are due to 
microstructural factors from those caused by macroeconomic factors and general investor 
confidence. The average order imbalance has experienced a sharp decline across the three 
regimes, as has the average daily return (computed using the midpoint of the end-of-day bid-
ask quotes). This result is consistent with expectations, as patterns in order flows should mimic 
patterns in returns given the strong documented imbalance-return relation (Chordia et al., 
2008).  
Correlation coefficients between daily returns and order imbalances are presented in Table 2. 
The correlation coefficients in all three regimes are lower than those reported in Chordia et al. 
(2008); however, considering the probable loss of precision due to the use of daily horizons, 
the correlations are strong. The correlation coefficients become weaker across the three 
liquidity regimes: they decrease from 31% to 23%. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of aggregate liquidity indicators (Liq – computed as the 
weighted average daily turnover across the share sample) and order imbalances (OIBR), 
as well as average daily return measures, by entire sample and by regime. 
Entire sample Liq (M) OIBR 
Avg. Daily 
Return 
Mean 6.003 0.087 0.045% 
Median 5.640 0.105  
Standard deviation 2.348 0.395  
Regime 1 
   
Mean 6.365 0.147 0.047% 
Median 6.157 0.194  
Standard deviation 1.600 0.377  
Regime 2 
   
Mean 5.828 0.108 0.084% 
Median 5.544 0.172  
Standard deviation 2.071 0.386  
Regime 3 
   
Mean 6.064 0.055 0.010% 
Median 5.597 0.056  
Standard deviation 2.678 0.403  
 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients between daily returns and lagged daily order 
imbalances, by entire sample and by regime. 
Return and OIBR 
Entire sample 0.251 
Regime 1 0.311 
Regime 2 0.275 
Regime 3 0.226 
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Table 3: Predictive regression of daily returns on lagged order imbalances, January 
2012 – June 2016. 
Dependent variable: Daily Return 
 Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Intercept -5.87731E-05  -0.217 
OIBR 0.006  8.657*** 
Adj. R-squared  6.2%  
 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
4.1 RETURN PREDICTABILITY 
Table 3 presents a basic regression of daily returns on lagged order imbalances, measured by 
Rands traded, for the entire sample period of January 2012 - June 2016. As in Chordia et al. 
(2005; 2008), OIBR is a significant predictor of daily returns. The coefficient on OIBR is 0.006, 
and is highly significant (t-statistic of 8.657). The coefficient is also significant in magnitude, 
given that the average daily return over the sample period is 0.0004 (Table 1). The explanatory 
power of the regression, at 6.2%, is substantial, given the omission of literally dozens of factors 
that have been empirically shown to predict returns.  
To determine whether and how Fama’s (1970) efficiency has evolved over time, predictive 
regressions were performed for each month over the sample. One could infer that the market 
has become more efficient if the time-series shows a decline in R2s and t-statistics for stock 
returns regressed on lagged order imbalances. Figure 1 shows a time-series of the R2’s and t-
statistics for these regressions. There is no uniform pattern in the significance and explanatory 
power of OIBR in predicting returns. However, there is an unmistakeable downward trend in 
both the R2 and t-statistic in the eight months following the move to Millennium Exchange in 
July 2012. Besides this piece of evidence that the trading platform upgrade improved Fama’s 
(1970) market efficiency, the regressions vary from highly significant to insignificant across 
months in the entire sample period. However, the percentage of statistically significant 
coefficients in the monthly regressions drops from 33% in Regime 1 to 19% in Regime 3. 
Similarly, the percentage of R2’s above 13% (the sample average) falls from 50% in Regime 1 
to 19% in Regime 3.   
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The time series of aggregate liquidity (turnover), as well as an annual (12-month) moving 
average, is plotted in Figure 2. The circled portions of the figure highlight the trends in the 
moving average of liquidity following the start of the second and third regimes. Although 
Figure 1 could suggest that the degree of market efficiency improved during the months 
following the Millennium Exchange migration in July 2012, the aggregate market liquidity 
trend is too noisy during Regime 2 to make a conclusion about systematic liquidity changes 
(Figure 2). It should be noted that a general market liquidity improvement following the 2 July 
2012 trading engine upgrade was found in Hattingh (2014) and Zito (2014). There is suggestive 
evidence that the second major structural break, the colocation centre launch, resulted in a 
continuous increase in market liquidity. Although Figures 1 and 2 do not reveal any obvious 
trends during the full sample period, the isolation of Regime 3 provides suggestive evidence 
that the colocation centre launch increased market liquidity, but with no discernible effect on 
the market efficiency trend.  
Figure 1: Market inefficiency trend, JSE Top 40 constituents, 2012 – 2016. Daily return 
predictions using lagged daily order imbalances. 
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Figure 2: Value-weighted daily aggregate turnover and annual (12-month) moving 
average, JSE Top 40 constituents, 2012 – 2016. 
 
The liquidity indicator, Liq, was stratified by separating liquid days from illiquid ones within 
each regime. The limiting effect of illiquidity on trading and arbitrage activity should be starker 
during abnormally illiquid days within a particular liquidity regime (Chordia et al., 2008). A 
day is categorised as low-liquidity if the linearly detrended liquidity indicator for that regime 
is at least one standard deviation below the expected liquidity indicator. Table 4 exhibits 
summary statistics for the liquidity indicator, Liq, on low and high liquidity days. The number 
of illiquid days as a percentage of the total number of trading days is largely constant across 
the three regimes. The mean liquidity indicator on liquid days is 1.6 times that on illiquid days 
during Regime 1, but increases to 2.5 times by Regime 3. The insight here is the amplification 
of the difference in the liquidity indicator on illiquid days relative to normal days during 
Regimes 2 and 3. This finding prompts the inference that the decreasing trend shown by the 
liquidity indicator in Table 1 is partly a product of extreme liquidity spikes during the later 
regimes, a presumption that is supported visually by Figure 2. The standard deviation of the 
Aggregate turnover 
12-period moving average turnover 
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liquidity indicator exhibits a definite increase across the three regimes (Table 1), thus the level 
of market liquidity was more volatile during the later regimes. Higher volatility in trading 
quantity on the JSE is a natural consequence of the progressive heightening of political and 
economic uncertainty in South Africa during the sample period, fuelled by governmental 
controversies and weak economic indicators. Another potential rationale for the relatively flat 
liquidity trend over the full sample period is the election of 6 of the 10 top listed JSE firms to 
pursue dual or primary listings overseas (Gobodo, 2007). This allows foreign investors to trade 
on their domestic exchanges, and volume traded in these shares on the JSE does not reach the 
potential levels implied by the utilisation of a faster and more efficient trading platform.               
Table 4: Distribution of the liquidity indicator, Liq, during liquid and illiquid days, by 
regime. The ratio calculates the average of Liq during liquid days to the average of Liq 
during illiquid days. 
  
Liq on liquid 
days (M) 
Liq on illiquid 
days (M) 
Ratio 
Regime 1 Mean 
6.632 4.270 1.553 
 
% of days 
91% 9%  
 
Number of days 
118 12  
Regime 2 Mean 
6.113 2.889 2.116 
 
% of days 
91% 9%  
 
Number of days 
443 42  
Regime 3 Mean 
6.308 2.485 2.538 
 
% of days 
92% 8%  
 
Number of days 
511 43  
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Table 5: Predictive regressions of daily returns on lagged order imbalances, and lagged 
order imbalance interacted with a dummy variable for low-liquidity days within each 
regime. 
  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Regime 1 OIBR 0.007  3.741*** 
 
OIBR*ILD -0.007  -0.983 
 
Intercept -0.001  -0.743 
 
Adj. R2 
 8.9%  
Regime 2 OIBR 0.006  6.247*** 
 
OIBR*ILD -0.005  -1.310 
 
Intercept 0.000  0.440 
 
Adj. R2 
 7.5%  
Regime 3 OIBR 0.006  5.469*** 
 
OIBR*ILD -0.005  -1.227 
 
Intercept 0.000  -0.477 
 
Adj. R2 
 5.0%  
Entire sample OIBR 0.006  8.879*** 
 
OIBR*ILD -0.005  -1.982** 
 
Intercept -8.50231E-05  -0.314 
 
Adj. R2 
 6.5%  
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
How does daily liquidity interact with Fama’s (1970) market efficiency? This question is 
addressed by performing the predictive regression of Table 3, with the addition of a low-
liquidity dummy (ILD) interacted with OIBR, in order to estimate the direct influence of 
liquidity on market efficiency. The low-liquidity dummy is designed to equal one on days of 
abnormally low liquidity, and zero otherwise. The results of the regressions of daily returns on 
order imbalances, and the interaction of order imbalances with low-liquidity, are presented in 
Table 5. For the full sample period, the coefficient on OIBR is positive and significant. 
However, contrary to the results of Chordia et al. (2008), the coefficient on the interaction 
variable, OIBR*ILD, is statistically significantly negative during the full sample period. This 
result contradicts the hypothesis that the effect of illiquidity on trading and arbitrage activity 
would be more pronounced during days of low liquidity. The negative coefficient on 
43 | P a g e  
 
OIBR*ILD suggests that the ability of OIBR to predict returns weakens during periods of 
illiquidity. In fact, this ability is almost neutralised. Intriguingly, this same result was found in 
Chung and Hrazdil (2010) amongst low-volume firms on the NYSE. 
The regression results by subperiod show that OIBR is always a significant predictor of returns: 
the t-statistic on the coefficient for OIBR is 3.74 in Regime 1, increases to 6.25 during Regime 
2, and falls to 5.47 during Regime 3. Additionally, the subperiod regressions show that the 
coefficients on the interaction variables are negative but insignificant for all regimes. The 
coefficients become more positive from Regime 1 to Regime 3, but the t-statistics on the 
coefficients increase in absolute value across the regimes. Thus, during the later subperiods, 
illiquidity is a relatively stronger stimulant on the ability of OIBR to predict returns. Liquidity 
seems to reduce market efficiency, albeit less so during the later subperiods. The explanatory 
power of the regressions has almost halved from Regime 1 to Regime 3, from 9% to 5%. 
Overall, the results of Table 5 display a puzzling case for the impact of liquidity on Fama’s 
(1970) market efficiency, but align somewhat with the second hypothesis of Chordia et al. 
(2008). The hypothesis states that if market makers fail to eliminate return predictability by 
utilizing the information in order flows, traders have incentives to trade on this information. 
The market is more efficient as a result, but less liquid due to increased adverse selection costs 
of trade. An interpretation of Figure 2 and Table 5 is that there has not been a perceptible 
general improvement in market liquidity over the regimes, yet the explanatory power of OIBR 
in predicting returns has decreased over the three regimes. However, OIBR remains a 
significant predictor of returns throughout all regimes. Illiquidity does not inhibit efficiency 
over the full sample period, but its inhibiting influence increases across regimes. A possible 
explanation for these findings is the emerging market status of South Africa – although the JSE 
is a relatively developed capital market, it is still subject to exogenous shocks and contagion 
effects that tend to plague developing countries during periods of instability. This will naturally 
have an effect on both market liquidity and price efficiency. 
Despite the confounded effect of liquidity on Fama’s (1970) market efficiency, the results of 
Table 5 do confirm the ability of order imbalance to predict next-period returns. This 
predictability represents an innovative inverse indicator of market efficiency. A robustness 
check was performed on this finding in order to test its interpretation and reliability. As 
suggested by Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), and echoed in Chordia et al. (2008), the 
predictability of returns from order imbalances may be rooted in autocorrelated imbalances. 
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The concern may be raised that the results of Table 5 could be affected by the changing 
behaviour of autocorrelations in the order imbalance series across the three regimes. Before 
analysing any serial correlation in the OIBR series, two types of unit root tests were performed 
to check for stationarity, as statistical issues arise when analysing non-stationary data. The 
results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are shown in 
Table 6. Each test was performed for each regime. For both tests, the null hypothesis is that the 
series is integrated of order one – it is stationary only after first-differencing. From the results 
presented in Table 6, in all regimes one can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (p-values 
equal 0.00). The results confirm that the OIBR series is stationary. Table 7 displays first-order 
serial correlations in OIBR for all regimes. The first-order autocorrelations in OIBR are 
insignificant during Regimes 1 and 2, but the first-order autocorrelation is 0.15 during Regime 
3, and is highly significant. Thus, the intertemporal behaviour of imbalance autocorrelations 
does not align with the trends in R2’s and t-statistics from the regressions of Table 5. If such 
imbalance autocorrelations were driving the predictability of returns from imbalances, one 
would observe an increase in R2’s and t-statistics across the regimes. Instead, there is reliable 
evidence that the opposite transpired for the R2’s as they decrease dramatically across the 
regimes. The t-statistic on the OIBR coefficient is highest during Regime 2, yet imbalance 
autocorrelations were insignificantly different from zero at all lags during this period.   
Table 6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the 
order imbalance series, Regimes 1, 2 and 3. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: OIBR has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -10.373 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -21.887 0.000*** 
Regime 3 -19.627 0.000*** 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: OIBR has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -10.514 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -22.021 0.000*** 
Regime 3 -19.774 0.000*** 
 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the daily order imbalance series, 
Regimes 1, 2 and 3. 
 Autocorrelation Q-Stat P-value 
Regime 1 0.048 0.291 0.590 
Regime 2 -0.019 0.174 0.677 
Regime 3 0.154 12.564 0.000*** 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 8: Regression of inverse market efficiency measure on regime indicators, liquidity 
and size variables. 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic P-value 
Intercept 
-2.363 0.205 -11.537 
1.76675E-
29*** 
Regime 1 
0.013 0.180 0.070 0.944 
Regime 2 
0.250 0.115 2.179 0.030** 
Regime 3 
-0.028 0.181 -0.153 0.878 
LIQ 
0.003 0.002 1.456 0.146 
SIZE 
0.021 0.020 1.075 0.283 
     
Adj. R-squared 
0.180%    
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Chung and Hrazdil (2010) explore how a market efficiency measure is affected by liquidity 
regimes, firm liquidity, and control variables for firm size, volume and trading frequency. The 
analysis conducted in this research includes a regression aimed to capture the spirit of Chung 
and Hrazdil’s (2010) market efficiency decomposition, but omits control variables for volume, 
as it exhibits multicollinearity with turnover, and trading frequency, as the sample firms do not 
vary considerably in terms of trading frequency. The inverse market efficiency measure 
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(MktEff) is the R2 of firm-month regressions of daily returns on OIBR. Note that, when 
interpreting the inverse market efficiency measure, higher values denote lower levels of market 
efficiency. This measure was regressed on indicator variables for the liquidity regimes, as well 
as a size factor, and a firm liquidity indicator. Table 8 presents the output of this regression, 
which largely corroborates the earlier results in this section. The positive coefficient on the 
liquidity variable (0.003) indicates that greater liquidity increases market inefficiency, although 
the coefficient on liquidity is not statistically significant. Consistent with Chung and Hrazdil 
(2010), firm size is a positive (but insignificant) predictor of market inefficiency (coefficient 
of 0.021). Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) show that order imbalance autocorrelations are 
greater for larger firms, which they attribute to institutional herding in larger firms. Stronger 
serial correlation in order imbalances drives stronger return forecastability from order flows, 
and thus increased market inefficiency. 
The coefficients on indicator variables for Regimes 1 and 3 are positive and negative, 
respectively, although insignificant. This supports the previous result of an intertemporal 
decrease in power of order imbalance in explaining variation in returns. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the indicator variable for Regime 2 is positive, and is the only significant variable 
in the regression. However, the explanatory power of the market efficiency regression is very 
low, with an adjusted R2 of only 0.2%. 
An important factor affecting the degree of market efficiency on the JSE is algorithmic trading, 
which is not accounted for in the regression equation of Table 6. Liquidity is not an effective 
proxy for algorithmic trading. In Zito (2014), a causative relationship between stock turnover 
and algorithmic trading could not be established around the time of the 2012 platform upgrade. 
Hattingh (2014) was unable to prove a correlation between greater algorithmic trading post the 
2012 trading engine upgrade, and secular liquidity increases on the JSE. Thus, algorithmic 
traders, by trading on arbitrage opportunities, could be the unidentified factor explaining the 
general improvement in market efficiency over time. It is important to separate the effect of 
algorithmic activity from that of market liquidity in order to understand the drivers of the 
convergence to market efficiency. This extension is left for exploration in future research.     
As a final route in determining whether inefficiency is at all related to liquidity, Granger 
causality tests were conducted. Regressions of the type in Table 3 were estimated for each 
month in the sample period, using all days within that month, and the imbalance coefficient 
was recorded. The daily liquidity indicator, aggregate turnover, was averaged over each month 
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to arrive at a monthly measure. Before performing the Granger causality tests, the two data 
series were tested for stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) tests. From the results presented in Table 9, one would reject the null hypothesis that the 
imbalance coefficient series has a unit root as the p-values are essentially zero. Hence the 
dataset is stationary. However, for the aggregate turnover series in Table 10, the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity cannot be rejected as the p-values are 0.18 (ADF test) and 0.22 (PP test). 
The turnover series was thus first differenced, and it can be seen from Table 10 that the series 
of first differences in turnover is stationary as the p-values are essentially zero for both the 
ADF test and the PP test. Thus, the Granger causality tests were performed using the measures 
of inefficiency (the imbalance coefficient), and the first difference in turnover, which can be 
interpreted as a measure of monthly changes in liquidity.  
The results of the Granger causality tests for the full sample period, and for each regime, are 
shown in Table 11. It is generally better to use more rather than fewer lags in the test regressions 
when performing Granger causality tests. Six lags were used in most regressions, however, due 
to fewer available observations in Regime 1, one lag was used in the test regression for Granger 
causality during this regime. The full sample period results confirm that there is no causative 
relationship running from liquidity changes to the inefficiency measure – the p-value for the 
null hypothesis that the change in aggregate turnover does not Granger-cause the imbalance 
coefficient is 0.39, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The reverse null hypothesis that 
the coefficient does not cause the change in aggregate turnover measure also cannot be rejected. 
The results are similar for each liquidity regime, but for one seemingly peculiar result in the 
Regime 1 results. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient does not cause the 
change in aggregate turnover is 0.01 for Regime 1, which seems to suggest a causative 
relationship running from the market inefficiency measure to changes in aggregate liquidity. 
Nonetheless, caution should be used when interpreting this result due to the small number of 
observations in the subsample. In sum, there is no evidence of econometric causality running 
from changes in aggregate liquidity to the market inefficiency measure, proxied by the 
coefficient in the regression of daily returns on order imbalances. On the JSE, liquidity has 
very little influence on the convergence to market efficiency.  
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Table 9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the 
order imbalance coefficient series, Entire Sample. 
 
 
 
 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 10: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the 
aggregate turnover and first difference series, Entire Sample. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Series has a unit root  
 t-Statistic P-value 
Aggregate turnover series, Entire 
Sample 
-2.883 0.176 
First difference in aggregate 
turnover series, Entire Sample 
-5.737 0.000*** 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Aggregate turnover series, Entire 
Sample 
-2.747 0.223 
First difference in aggregate 
turnover series, Entire Sample 
-12.401 0.000*** 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Entire Sample -4.908 0.001*** 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Entire Sample -4.925 0.001*** 
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Table 11: Granger causality test results of market liquidity (proxied by the first 
difference in aggregate turnover) and market inefficiency (proxied by order imbalance 
coefficient in monthly regression of daily returns on order imbalances), Entire Sample 
and by regime. 
Entire Sample 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic P-value 
Liquidity does not Granger Cause 
Efficiency 1.080 0.394 
Efficiency does not Granger Cause 
Liquidity 0.198 0.975 
Regime 1 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic P-value 
Liquidity does not Granger Cause 
Efficiency 0.301 0.680 
Efficiency does not Granger Cause 
Liquidity 1913.900 0.014** 
Regime 2  
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic P-value 
Liquidity does not Granger Cause 
Efficiency 0.439 0.818 
Efficiency does not Granger Cause 
Liquidity 0.992 0.646 
Regime 3 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic P-value 
Liquidity does not Granger Cause 
Efficiency 1.002 0.499 
Efficiency does not Granger Cause 
Liquidity 0.366 0.877 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level 
 
 
4.2 DEVIATIONS FROM RANDOM WALKS ACROSS LIQUIDITY 
ENVIRONMENTS  
Under Fama’s (1970) EMH, an efficient market is one in which investors cannot expect to 
realise arbitrage profits from trading strategies. The previous section focuses on return 
predictability from order flows as an inverse measure of Fama’s (1970) market efficiency, but 
does not address whether prices follow a random walk. This section uses a comparison of short- 
and long-horizon variance ratios as an assessment of whether deviations from a random walk 
(and thus from an efficient market benchmark, in Fama’s (1970) sense) have changed over the 
liquidity regimes. Deviations from a random walk can emerge because the market maker’s 
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inventory control activity prompts serial correlation in returns. If algorithmic traders help the 
market maker to absorb outside orders, such deviations would diminish. There should be 
smaller deviations from a random walk price process when trading is more infused with 
algorithmic activity.  
The ratio of fifteen-minute to open-to-close midquote return variances for each regime are 
presented in Table 12. A random walk process prescribes a variance ratio of unity. The variance 
ratios across the regimes signal a significant amount of noise in stock prices: the short-horizon 
variance ratio is two to three times greater than that of the long horizon. Prices do not follow a 
random walk in any of the regimes. However, the degree of noise created by the trading process 
decreases between Regime 1 and 3: the ratio is 2.74 in Regime 1, increases slightly to 2.88 in 
Regime 2 (although the difference between the ratios in Regimes 1 and 2 is statistically 
insignificant), and decreases to 2.06 during Regime 3. The p-value for a one-tail t-test on the 
variance ratios for Regimes 2 and 3 is below 0.05, thus one can safely state that the variance 
ratios in Regime 3 are significantly lower relative to those in Regime 2. The evidence accords 
with that of the preceding analysis: the JSE Top 40 has become more efficient over the sample 
period, as prices have converged more closely to a random walk process. Given the evidence 
in Zito (2014) and Hattingh (2014), this period coincides with a proliferation of algorithmic 
trading on the JSE. Algorithmic traders are more likely to recognise profitable price patterns 
and arbitrage opportunities, and by exploiting them, bring prices closer to efficient market 
benchmarks. 
                         
Table 12: Ratios of fifteen minute return variance to open-to-close return variance 
(scaled by the number of fifteen minute intervals in a day), by regime. 
 
Regime 1 Regime 2  Regime 3 
Variance Ratio 
2.74 2.88 2.06 
  
Regime 1 and 2 Regime 2 and 3 
P-value for differences across 
regimes  0.258 0.041** 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
51 | P a g e  
 
4.3 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
The preceding pieces of analysis have focused on proving a case for the convergence to market 
efficiency, where market efficiency has implicitly been characterised in the sense of Fama 
(1970): a lack of return predictability, and conformity to a random walk price process. As has 
been emphasised throughout this study, market efficiency can also be set within the realm of 
the microstructure literature, inspired by Shiller (1981; 2003). This second arm of ‘two-
pronged efficiency’, termed informational efficiency, considers the degree to which asset prices 
reflect private information about firm fundamentals as a gauge of market efficiency.  
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) hypothesise that improved informational efficiency 
should be a consequence of greater market liquidity. In the context of that paper, a smaller tick 
size allows market participants to trade on ever-smaller pieces of information, and it is expected 
that informed trading will increase as the tick size decreases. The authors use the French and 
Roll (1986) ratio of open-to-close to close-to-open return variances to test this hypothesis. 
French and Roll (1986) find that this ratio is substantially greater than one, implying more price 
volatility when the market is open. Three potential explanations are considered: (1) volatility 
is caused by the incorporation of private information when informed traders trade; (2) volatility 
is caused by pricing errors due to investor behavioural factors or market frictions and 
microstructure noise; and (3) volatility is caused by public information arriving during business 
hours. French and Roll (1986) reject (3) as variance ratios are not significantly different during 
business days when the exchange is closed. Therefore, the variance ratio can be related either 
to mispricing or the amount of private information incorporated into prices. The aim of this 
section is to assess whether variance ratios have changed during the course of the three liquidity 
regimes, and whether any discernible pattern of changes reveals which of the two potential 
explanations expressed by French and Roll (1986) is dominant. Table 13 reports the open-to-
close/close-to-open per-hour variance ratios for the three regimes. Consistent with French and 
Roll (1986), all variance ratios indicate that price volatility is much higher during trading hours 
than during non-trading hours. A one-tailed t-test confirms that this difference is significant: 
the p-value for the null hypothesis that open-close volatility does not exceed close-open 
volatility is close to zero (0.0005), therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is a very 
high statistical probability that trading-time volatility far exceeds non-trading time volatility. 
The trading-versus-non-trading variance ratios for Regimes 1, 2 and 3 are 1.06, 8.82, and 6.62, 
respectively. The p-values from one-tailed t-tests indicate that these differences are statistically 
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significant. As in Chordia et al. (2008), the variance ratio increases between Regimes 1 and 3. 
However, the ratio decreases between Regimes 2 and 3. It is acknowledged that these data 
points are insufficient to reach a conclusion on how trading-versus-non-trading variance has 
changed across the sample period. Additionally, external factors such as adjustments in US 
Federal Reserve policy could have influenced the relationship between trading-time and non-
trading time volatility on the JSE. The results are thus to be interpreted with caution.      
What could be the phenomenon causing excess trading-time volatility? French and Roll (1986) 
use first-order daily return autocorrelations to distinguish between the mispricing argument and 
the informed trading argument. They surmise that the absolute autocorrelation level is 
positively related to mispricing in the form of microstructural frictions or investor behavioural 
factors such as misreaction to information. Thus, an examination of first-order daily return 
autocorrelations offers suggestive evidence of the driving phenomenon behind the high 
variance ratios, and why they have fluctuated across the regimes. Prior to the analysis of daily 
return autocorrelations, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests were performed to 
check for stationarity in the daily return series. Table 14 presents the ADF and PP test results 
for the daily return series of each regime. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected 
for all regimes: the p-values are below 0.05 for all of the ADF and the PP tests. Therefore the 
daily return series is stationary for all regimes. Table 15 presents first-order autocorrelations 
for the daily return series in each regime. The first-order daily return autocorrelation is negative 
and insignificant in all cases. The first-order autocorrelation decreases in absolute value (in 
other words, it tends closer to zero) across the regimes: from -0.072 in Regime 1, to -0.034 in 
Regime 2, and to -0.004 in Regime 3. Nonetheless, all of the first-order autocorrelations are 
insignificant. There is no evidence of first-order autocorrelation in the daily stock returns 
during any regime. This finding is consistent with Babikir et al. (2012). However, there is 
strong evidence for significant higher order return autocorrelations during Regimes 1 and 2 
(shown in Appendix III).   
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Table 13: Ratios of open-to-close/close-to-open per-hour return variances, by regime. 
 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Variance Ratio 
1.06 8.82 6.62 
  
Regime 1 
and 2 
Regime 2 
and 3 
P-value for differences between regimes 
 0.000*** 0.003*** 
P-value for differences in open-close volatility 
versus close-open volatility over all regimes 0.000***  
  
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 14: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root test results on the 
daily return series, Regimes 1, 2 and 3. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Daily return series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -10.489 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -22.715 0.000*** 
Regime 3 -23.279 0.000*** 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Daily return series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -12.236 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -22.852 0.000*** 
Regime 3 -23.326 0.000*** 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 15: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the daily return series, Regimes 1, 
2 and 3. 
 Autocorrelation Q-Stat P-value 
Regime 1 -0.072 0.684 0.408 
Regime 2 -0.034 0.557 0.455 
Regime 3 -0.004 0.007 0.932 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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There is ample evidence of nonlinear stock return dependencies on the JSE (Babikir et al., 
2012; Kruger et al., 2012; Mangani, 2007; McMillan, 2004; Unterhorst, 2014). Given the 
evidence of nonlinear serial return behaviour, as well as linear serial dependence not being a 
necessary condition for nonlinear serial dependence (Hinich & Lim, 2008), it was thought 
prudent to examine autocorrelations in the squared stock returns. Nonlinear reverting patterns 
in returns, in the form of positive-return persistence through time, are captured through 
autocorrelations of squared (absolute) returns (Babikir et al., 2012). Before analysing 
correlograms, ADF and PP tests were performed on the squared returns series for all regimes, 
in order to test for stationarity. The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table 16. All 
of the ADF tests and the PP tests confirm that the squared returns series are stationary for all 
regimes: the p-values are below 0.05 for all tests. The first-order autocorrelations for the 
squared returns series in each regime are presented in Table 17. From Table 17, it is evident 
that there was no nonlinear serial dependence during Regimes 1 and 2, as the autocorrelation 
statistics are insignificant. Yet the results for Regime 3 show that there was significant 
nonlinear serial dependence in the return series. Nonlinear serial dependence has become 
stronger across the three regimes. These episodic incidences of nonlinear serial dependence 
support Kruger et al. (2012), who find evidence of significant nonlinear serial dependence for 
JSE shares, the occurrence of which is episodic in nature.  
The variance ratio provides evidence on the informational efficiency of the pricing system in 
the essence of Kyle (1985). During Regime 1, trading-time return variance was roughly one-
for-one with return variance during non-trading hours. The ratio of trading-time to non-trading 
time return variance experienced a great rise between Regimes 1 and 2, but significantly 
decreased between Regimes 2 and 3. The latter trend was coupled with a surge in nonlinear 
serial dependence. The lower relative trading-time variance during Regime 3 is evidently due 
to a higher degree of positive-return persistence during the latest regime. Thus, it cannot be 
concluded that the latest regime facilitated a greater degree of informational efficiency. It is 
proposed that the existence of positive-return persistence during the most recent regime could 
be due to investor misreaction to information, and/ or microstructural frictions such as 
increased adverse selection costs. The possibility of increased adverse selection costs during 
the later regimes was also inferred in Section 4.1.  
The consideration of nonlinear processes is essential when assessing weak-form market 
efficiency on the JSE. An examination of linear serial return dependence in Table 15 seems to 
suggest a lack of first-order daily return autocorrelation on the JSE. Yet, Table 17 confirms the 
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existence of nonlinear serial return dependence, which can arise due to microstructure effects; 
nonlinear feedback mechanisms in price movements; transaction costs and investor 
behavioural biases (Antoniou, Ergul & Holmes, 1997). As in Kruger et al. (2012), there are 
only intermittent periods of linear or nonlinear serial return dependence on the JSE. Note that 
this does not necessarily negate the weak-form efficiency of the stock market, in the spirit of 
Fama (1970), as return dependence is intertemporally inconsistent and thus may not be easily 
predictable and economically exploitable over time. 
It was shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 that over the sample period 2012 – 2016, JSE Top 40 
returns experienced a reduction in predictability from order flows, as well as a closer 
convergence to a random walk benchmark. Nevertheless, JSE Top 40 prices became less 
informationally efficient. It is possible for a market to move toward fulfilment of the Fama 
(1970) criteria for market efficiency, but for its constituent asset prices to simultaneously 
become less representative of fundamental firm value.  
 
Table 16: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root test results on the 
squared daily return series, Regimes 1, 2 and 3. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Squared daily return series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -11.353 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -3.493 0.041** 
Regime 3 -12.951 0.000*** 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Squared daily return series has a unit root 
 t-Statistic P-value 
Regime 1 -11.362 0.000*** 
Regime 2 -22.928 0.000*** 
Regime 3 -20.729 0.000*** 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 17: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for the squared daily return series, 
Regimes 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
Note: (*) Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The analyses carried out in this study have aimed to (1) introduce a new inverse measure of 
market efficiency i.e. return predictability from order imbalances that has been hitherto 
unexplored in the South African literature; (2) understand the inverse efficiency measure’s time 
variation and relation to liquidity; and (3) provide a degree of reconciliation of Fama’s (1970) 
definition of market efficiency to that of Shiller (1981; 2003).  
Uniquely to the South African literature, this study has proven that order imbalances are a 
significant predictor of daily returns, and, although the significance of the predictability has 
decreased somewhat over time, it remains strongly embedded in JSE returns data. A proposed 
rationale for this return predictability from order imbalances is limited market making capacity: 
market makers make incomplete adjustments to, or misreact to information contained in 
asymmetric order flows.  
Contrary to international studies, the relationship between market efficiency and liquidity on 
the JSE is less clear-cut. An examination of an aggregate turnover measure for liquidity shows 
that, although hypothesised that liquidity would generally increase after the structural breaks 
marking Regimes 2 and 3, there has not been a long-term upward trend in aggregate liquidity. 
While there was an uptick in liquidity after the second structural break denoting the start of 
Regime 3, increased volatility in liquidity prevented a systematic increase in market liquidity 
during the third regime. Regressions of daily returns on order imbalances that include dummy 
variables for illiquid days within each regime confirm that illiquidity is unable to enhance the 
ability of order imbalances to predict returns.   
Thus, unlike international studies, it cannot be concluded that liquidity aids in the convergence 
to market efficiency (in the Fama (1970) sense). Moreover, in a regression of an inverse market 
 Autocorrelation Q-Stat P-value 
Regime 1 0.019 0.049 0.825 
Regime 2 0.065 2.053 0.152 
Regime 3 0.167 15.612 0.000*** 
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efficiency measure (the R2 of firm-month regressions of daily returns on order imbalances) on 
regime indicators and factors for stock liquidity and size, only one of the independent variables, 
the Regime 2 indicator regressor, is a significant predictor of market inefficiency. The factors 
affecting market efficiency on the JSE remain unknown, although it is proposed that 
algorithmic trading could be one of these missing factors. As established in Hattingh (2014) 
and Zito (2014), the Millennium Exchange upgrade was strongly associated with higher levels 
of algorithmic activity, but not necessarily with increased liquidity. A potential interpretation 
of the results in this study is that the trading platform upgrade facilitated a rush of algorithmic 
traders, who are more likely to trade on price patterns such as those arising from information 
in order flows. Market efficiency improved, but exogenous factors, such as systematic 
emerging market instability, have a confounding effect on market liquidity. The JSE Top 40’s 
conformity to Fama’s (1970) EMH has been evidenced through reduced return predictability 
from order imbalances, as well as improved adherence to a random walk benchmark, measured 
by short-to-long-horizon variance ratios. Over the three regimes, the JSE Top 40 has become 
more efficient in the spirit of Fama’s (1970) EMH. 
As championed by Shiller (1981; 2003) and in the rich microstructure literature (Bagehot, 
1971; Campbell & Kyle, 1993; Kyle, 1985; Poterba & Summers, 1988), informational 
efficiency, or the degree to which prices reflect information about firm fundamentals, is also 
an indicator of financial market efficiency. A comparison of trading-time versus non-trading 
time return variances shows that excess volatility during trading hours decreases across 
Regimes 2 to 3. This result is coupled with a strong emergence of nonlinear serial return 
dependence, which is indicative of greater mispricing due to traders’ behavioural biases or 
trading frictions. Thus, informational efficiency decreased during the course of the three 
regimes. The infusion of algorithmic trading following the 2012 platform upgrade likely 
reduced the pervasiveness of price patterns through more reliable recognition and exploitation 
of these patterns. However, it is suggested that algorithmic trading has not brought about more 
accurate pricing of information on firm fundamentals. In fact, it could be inferred that 
mispricing increased after the platform upgrade, whether due to traders’ misreaction to 
information or market frictions such as adverse selection costs.        
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4.5 LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS TO THIS STUDY 
The aim of the Chordia et al. (2008) work was to gauge the link between liquidity and intraday 
market efficiency. The authors emphasise intraday intervals as inefficiencies are not likely to 
persist over daily horizons. As mentioned earlier, the data availability constraints encountered 
during this study have limited the research in two important ways: first, the use of daily data 
for the return predictability regressions restricts precision in detecting price patterns 
representing market inefficiency; and second, the four-year sample period means that certain 
important structural breaks in the evolution of the JSE’s market liquidity have not been 
included in the analysis (most notably, the 1996 move to an automated trading platform). The 
liquidity regimes are also not entirely comparable in terms of length: for example, Regime 1 
contains just six months of data, while Regime 2 contains 22 months, and Regime 3, 26 months. 
Despite the theoretical loss of precision in detecting deviations from market efficiency, this 
study has proven that return predictability from past information does arise and persist at a 
daily horizon. An interesting avenue for future research is whether this return predictability is 
economically exploitable, specifically, whether it is possible to earn an abnormal profit by 
trading on the order imbalance. Confirmation of inefficiency requires a demonstration that 
returns can consistently outperform those of a buy-and-hold strategy of comparable risk. 
This study has focused on a small sample of JSE Top 40 shares, all of which have large market 
capitalisations and high trading frequencies. A worthwhile extension of this research would be 
to include a larger and more diverse sample of shares, spanning firms of all sizes. In light of 
Chung and Hrazdil’s (2010) assertion that short-horizon return predictability from past order 
flows varies significantly across portfolios stratified by firm size, trading frequency, and 
trading volume, it is recommended that controls for these factors be applied in cross-sectional 
research designs.  
One of the conclusions to this study was that the structural breaks prompted algorithmic activity 
to infuse daily trade, which lowered return predictability from past order imbalances. Although 
previous South African studies have confirmed the correlation between the trading platform 
upgrade and increased algorithmic activity, this study has provided no direct evidence of a 
positive association between algorithmic activity and market efficiency. Future studies should 
include a proxy for algorithmic trading in order to understand the predictors of the inverse 
market efficiency measure.     
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Finally, this study has used a measure of aggregate turnover as a proxy for market liquidity. 
Future studies should compare these results to those obtained using other liquidity measures, 
especially the multidimensional liquidity metric of Liu (2006), which should capture greater 
liquidity variation in smaller firms due to trading speed, continuity and ease of trade.    
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The theory of efficient markets has incredible importance in the field of finance. Its validity 
has preoccupied financial economists and practitioners for decades. Fama’s (1970) Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis describes an efficient market as one that is sufficiently competitive so as 
to eliminate the expectation of realising an arbitrage profit from trading strategies, excluding 
transactions costs. It follows that asset returns should not be predictable from past, public or 
private pertinent information, corresponding to weak-, semi-strong- and strong-form market 
efficiency. If prices update rapidly on the arrival of new information, price changes should 
express the same randomness as the arrival of new information. Operating in parallel to the 
Fama (1970) definition is the market efficiency characterisation of Shiller (1981; 2003). Under 
Shiller (1981; 2003), an efficient financial market is one in which asset prices mirror the 
fundamental values of the assets, and movements in asset prices are rooted in new information 
about fundamental values. One of the aims of this study has been to find a point of intersection 
for these parallel ideas.  
The primary aim of this study was to establish whether a relationship exists between greater 
market liquidity and a convergence to market efficiency, where market efficiency is 
demarcated by both Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003). Market liquidity is proxied by a 
weighted average measure of aggregate share turnover. Exogenous structural breaks 
corresponding to supposed increases in market liquidity levels were identified, corresponding 
to the trading platform upgrade in July 2012, and the colocation facility launch in May 2014. 
These structural breaks denote the bounds of the three liquidity regimes. It was hypothesised 
that these structural breaks represent improvements in market microstructure, enabling easier, 
faster and less costly trading, which in turn should be related to price formation and behaviour. 
Specifically, a more liquid market should be more efficient because astute traders can more 
readily exploit return predictability, mispricing and/ or their superior information, thereby 
facilitating a convergence to market efficiency. An understanding of the relationship between 
market structure, liquidity and price behaviour has implications for the theory of how prices 
aggregate information, as well as for practical policy purposes. 
In evaluating the link between liquidity and market efficiency, tests were carried out on both 
the Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003) definitions of market efficiency. The hypothesis was 
that liquidity would influence both of these channels: it encourages arbitrage trading, which 
61 | P a g e  
 
diminishes return predictability; and it encourages trading on incremental pieces of private 
information, which brings prices closer to full-information values. 
The first part of the analysis showed that return predictability from past order imbalances does 
exist in the share sample. This predictability is economically substantial and persistent through 
time, although its significance has decreased somewhat across the three regimes. Surprisingly, 
this predictive relation is not influenced by liquidity. Extensive tests of a direct relationship 
between liquidity and return predictability could not confirm the existence of such a 
relationship. Predictive regressions of returns on order imbalances, with the addition of an 
interaction dummy variable capturing days of abnormally low liquidity within each regime, 
were performed for each liquidity subperiod. The insignificant coefficients contradict the 
hypothesis that the ability of order imbalances to predict returns should be amplified during 
illiquid periods within each regime. If anything, the coefficient on the interaction variable is 
significantly negative during the full sample period, suggesting that the predictability of returns 
from order flows weakens during periods of illiquidity. In a separate regression of an inverse 
measure of market efficiency on indicator variables for each regime, as well as on liquidity and 
size factors, liquidity has no predictive relationship with efficiency. The influence of liquidity 
on return predictability is insignificant, and an unknown factor seems to be driving changes in 
this predictability over time. It is proposed that, in partial accordance with expectations, the 
structural breaks encouraged an infusion of algorithmic trade, which improved market 
efficiency, but confounding effects such as exogenous market shocks prevented a general 
increase in liquidity.  
The second piece of analysis, of short- to long-horizon variance ratios, signalled a significant 
amount of noise in stock prices: prices did not follow a random walk price process during any 
of the regimes. However, consistent with the general decline in return predictability across the 
regimes, prices are significantly closer to a random walk benchmark during the most recent 
regime relative to the earlier ones. In aggregate, the evidence supports the hypothesis that 
increased algorithmic trading activity enhances market efficiency by reducing return 
predictability, but there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that market liquidity is 
associated with enhanced market efficiency.    
The first two pieces of analysis in this study focused on proving the convergence to the Fama 
(1970) idea of market efficiency, which implies a lack of return predictability. In parallel to the 
Fama (1970) definition is that of Shiller (1981; 2003), which is the definition embraced by the 
62 | P a g e  
 
microstructure literature. Termed informational efficiency, this definition considers the amount 
of private information about firm fundamentals reflected in asset prices. The hypothesis here 
was that liquidity encourages trading on private information as it allows smart investors to trade 
large quantities quickly, at low cost, with little price impact. This enhances informational 
efficiency by bringing prices closer to fundamental or full-information values. In consideration 
of this definition of market efficiency, ratios of per-hour open-close to close-open volatility 
were analysed in conjunction with first-order daily return autocorrelations. Trading-time 
volatility is much greater than non-trading time volatility during the later regimes, but the 
relative difference decreases across the later regimes. This could suggest that the phenomenon 
causing excess trading-time volatility to arise dissipates from Regime 2 to Regime 3.  
An investigation of first-order daily return autocorrelations, as well as tests of nonlinear serial 
return dependencies sheds light on the possible driving factors behind high trading-time 
variances. The first-order daily return autocorrelation decreases in absolute value across the 
regimes, but it is insignificantly different from zero across all regimes. At face value, this seems 
to suggest that the observed decrease in the trading-time/ non-trading time variance ratio is not 
due to changes in the degree of mispricing of JSE Top 40 shares. Nevertheless, given the vast 
amount of empirical evidence of nonlinear stock return dependencies on the JSE, tests were 
conducted for such nonlinear dependencies in each regime.  
Consistent with previous South African studies, it was found that nonlinear serial return 
dependencies are episodic in nature, and are stronger during the more recent regime. The 
significant decline in the trading-time/ non-trading time variance ratio across the later regimes, 
coupled with the surge in nonlinear serial return dependence, suggests that positive-return 
persistence during the later regime has reduced relative trading-time volatility. Positive-return 
persistence can manifest due to investor misreaction to information, and/ or microstructural 
frictions such as increased adverse selection costs.  
Thus, while prices have become less predictable over time, the JSE Top 40 index has become 
less informationally efficient. While the structural breaks have not necessarily facilitated a 
general increase in market liquidity, they have stimulated more algorithmic trade (Hattingh, 
2014; Zito, 2014). Algorithmic traders have likely reduced the pervasiveness of price patterns 
through more reliable recognition and exploitation of these patterns. However, these traders do 
not transact on information about firm fundamentals, and thus do not engender a higher degree 
of informational efficiency.                   
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As proposed in Section 2.1.1, it is conceivable for the stock price to be weak-form efficient 
according to Fama (1970) - it cannot be predicted from past public information - but at the 
same time to be incorrectly valued, as there is some information about fundamental value that 
is not reflected in the price. This study has shown that over three microstructural regimes, the 
JSE Top 40 has become more weak-form efficient in the spirit of Fama’s (1970) EMH, but 
informational efficiency has deteriorated. The ideas of Fama (1970) and Shiller (1981; 2003), 
of what constitutes an efficient market, have hopefully moved one step closer toward a unified 
theory of market efficiency. Importantly, efficiency is not an infallible state of a market, but a 
process. Either or both meanings of efficiency may prevail at any time, and they should be 
viewed as complementary, but independent. Tests of return predictability or conformity to 
random walk benchmarks should be incomplete without tests of informational efficiency, and 
vice versa. 
The contribution of this study to the field is threefold: it introduces a new inverse measure of 
market efficiency – return predictability from order imbalances - previously unexplored in the 
South African literature; it provides insight into the measure’s time variation and relation to 
liquidity; and it takes a step toward understanding how the ideas of Fama (1970) and Shiller 
(1981; 2003) can both hold independently and inform one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 | P a g e  
 
6 LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Acharya, V., & Pedersen, L. (2005). Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial 
 Economics, 77(2), 375–410. 
Admati, A., & Pfleiderer, P. (1988). A theory of intraday patterns: volume and price  
variability. Review of Financial Studies, 1(1), 3–40. 
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects.  
Journal of Financial Markets, 5(1), 31–56. 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1980). Dealership market: Market making with inventory.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1), 31-53.  
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1982). Asset price behaviour in a dealership market. 
 Financial Analysts Journal, 38(3), 50-59.  
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 17(2), 223–249. 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., & Pedersen, L. (2005). Liquidity and asset prices.    
Foundations and Trends in Finance, 1(4), 269–364. 
Antoniou, A., Ergul, N., & Holmes, P. (1997). Market efficiency, thin trading and non-linear  
behaviour: Evidence from an emerging market. European Financial Management, 3(2),  
175-190. 
Auret, C., & Sinclaire, R. (2006). Book-to-market ratio and returns on the JSE.  
Investment Analysts Journal, 63, 31-38. 
 
 
65 | P a g e  
 
Babikir, A., Gupta, R., Mwabutwa, C., & Owusu-Sekyere, E. (2012). Structural breaks and  
GARCH models of stock return volatility: The case of South Africa. Working Paper No.  
201030. University of Pretoria, Department of Economics. 
Bachelier, L. (1900). Theory of speculation. In P. Cootner (Ed.), The 
Random Character of Stock Market Prices (pp. 17-78). Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Bagehot, Webster pseud. for Jack Treynor (1971). The Only Game in Town. Financial  
Analysts Journal, 27(2), 12-17. 
Bailey, G., & Gilbert, E. (2007). The impact of liquidity on mean reversion of share returns 
on the JSE. Investment Analysts Journal, 66, 19-30.  
Banz, R. (1981). The relationship between return and market value of common stocks.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 3-18. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 49(3), 307–343. 
Basiewicz, P., & Auret, C. (2009). Another look at the cross-section of average returns on  
the JSE. Investment Analysts Journal, 69, 23-38. 
Basu, S. (1977). The investment performance of common stocks in relation to their price to 
earnings ratio: A test of the efficient markets hypothesis. The Journal of Finance, 32(3),  
663- 682. 
Bauman, W., Conover, C., & Miller, R. (1998). Growth versus value and large-cap 
versus small-cap stocks in international markets. Financial Analysts Journal, 54(2), 75-89. 
Bernstein, P. (1987). Liquidity, stock markets, and market makers. Financial Management, 
16(2), 54-62. 
66 | P a g e  
 
Black, F. (1986). Noise. The Journal of Finance, 41(3), 529-543. 
Boehmer, E., Fong, K., & Wu, J. (2012). International evidence on algorithmic trading.   
Working Paper, EDHEC Business School. 
Brennan, M., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1996). Market microstructure and asset pricing: On 
the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3),  
441-464.  
Campbell, J., & Kyle, A. (1993). Smart money, noise trading and stock price behaviour.  
Review of Economic Studies, 60(1), 1-34. 
Chaboud, A., Chiquoine, B., Hjalmarsson, E., & Vega, C. (2014). Rise of the 
machines: Algorithmic trading in the foreign exchange market. The Journal of 
Finance, 69(5), 2045-2084. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2000). Commonality in liquidity. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 56(1), 3–28. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2001). Market liquidity and trading activity.  
The Journal of Finance, 56(2), 501–530. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2002). Order imbalance, liquidity and market  
returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(1), 111–130. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2005). Evidence on the speed of convergence to  
market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), 271–292. 
 
67 | P a g e  
 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2008). Liquidity and market efficiency. Journal  
of Financial Economics, 87(2), 249–268. 
Chordia, T., Sarkar, A., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2005). An empirical analysis of stock and 
bond market liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 18(1), 85–129. 
Chordia, T., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2004). Order imbalance and individual stock returns: 
Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 72(3), 485–518.  
Chung, D., & Hrazdil, K. (2010). Liquidity and market efficiency: A large sample study. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(10), 2346–2357. 
Conrad, J., Wahal, S., & Xiang, J. (2015). High-frequency quoting, trading, and the  
efficiency of prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(2), 271–291. 
Cowles, A. (1933). Can stock market forecasters forecast? Econometrica, 1(3), 309-324. 
Cowles, A. (1944). Stock market forecasting. Econometrica, 12(3/4), 206-214. 
Cubbins, E., Eidne, M., Firer, C., & Gilbert, E. (2006). Mean reversion on the JSE Securities 
Exchange. Investment Analysts Journal, 63, 1-17. 
De Villiers, J. (1996). The liquidity of financial assets. South African Journal of  
Economics, 64(2), 76-86.  
Demsetz, H. (1968). The cost of transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82(1), 33–53. 
Dimson, E., & Mussavian, M. (1998). A brief history of market efficiency. 
European Financial Management, 4(1), 91-103. 
Easley, D., Hvidkjaer, S., & O’Hara, M. (2002). Is information risk a determinant 
of asset returns? The Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2185-2221.  
68 | P a g e  
 
Easley, D., Kiefer, N., & O’Hara, M. (1997). The information content of the trading  
process. Journal of Empirical Finance, 4(2-3), 159-186. 
Easley, D., Kiefer, N., O’Hara, M., & Paperman, J. (1996). Liquidity, information, and 
 infrequently traded stocks. The Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1405-1436.  
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. 
The Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. 
Fama, E., & French, K. (1992). The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of  
Finance, 47(2), 427-465. 
Fama, E., & French, K. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. 
Fleming, M., & Remolona, E. (1999). Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. Treasury 
market: The response to public information. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1901-1915. 
French, K., & Roll, R. (1986). Stock return variances: The arrival of new 
information and the reaction of traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 17(1), 5-26. 
Garbade, K. (1982). Securities Markets. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Gilbertson, B., & Roux, F. (1977). The Johannesburg Stock Exchange as an efficient 
market. Investment Analysts Journal, 9, 21 –27.  
Glosten, L., & Milgrom, P. (1985). Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market 
with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 71-100. 
 
 
69 | P a g e  
 
Gobodo, K. (2007). The JSE investment case. Retrieved from http://www.afenacapital.com/all 
-docs/69-the-jse-investment-case-khaya-gobodo-january-2007/file.html on October 11,  
2016. 
Grossman, S., & Miller, M. (1988). Liquidity and market structure. The Journal of Finance,  
43(3), 617-633.  
Grossman, S., & Stiglitz, J. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient  
markets. The American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408. 
Hasbrouck, J., & Schwartz, R. (1988). Liquidity and execution costs in equity markets.  
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 14(3), 10-16. 
Hasbrouck, J., & Seppi, D. (2001). Common factors in prices, order flows and liquidity.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 59(3), 383–411. 
Hattingh, A. (2014). JSE Equity Market Liquidity: The Impact of Technology and Resultant 
Microstructure Changes. (Unpublished master’s dissertation). University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  
He, H., & Wang, J. (1995). Differential information and dynamic behavior of stock trading 
volume. Review of Financial Studies, 8(4), 919–972. 
Hendershott, T., Jones, C., & Menkveld, A. (2011). Does algorithmic trading improve 
liquidity? The Journal of Finance, 66(1), 1–33. 
Hiemstra, C., & Jones, J. (1994). Testing for linear and nonlinear Granger causality in the  
stock price–volume relation. The Journal of Finance, 49(5), 1639–1664. 
 
70 | P a g e  
 
Hinich, M., & Lim, K. (2008). The weak-form efficiency of Chinese stock markets: Thin  
trading, nonlinearity and episodic serial dependencies. Journal of Emerging Market  
Finance, 8(2), 133-163. 
Ho, T., & Stoll, H. (1981). Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and return  
uncertainty. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 47-73.  
Huberman, G., & Halka, D. (2001). Systematic Liquidity. Journal of Financial Research,  
24(2), 161-178.  
Jain, P. (2005). Financial market design and the equity premium: Electronic versus floor 
trading. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2955-2985.  
Jefferis, K., & Smith, G. (2004). Capitalisation and weak-form efficiency in the JSE  
securities exchange. South African Journal of Economics, 72(4), 684-707. 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (1994). Monthly Bulletin, 1991-1994. Retrieved from  
https://subscriptions.jse.co.za/historical-bulletins on September 25, 2015.  
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (2011). JSE’s new trading platform to offer faster trading 
capabilities. [press release] Retrieved from https://www.jse.co.za/news/jse%E2%80%99s- 
new-trading-platform-to-offer-faster-trading-capabilities on September 25, 2015.  
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (2013). Colocation services documentation. Drafted by JSE  
Trading Services. Retrieved from 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSETechnologyDocumentItems/1.%20JSE%20Colocation% 
20Services%20Documentation%20v1.00.pdf on May 29, 2016. 
 
71 | P a g e  
 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (2014). JSE launches high tech colocation centre. [press 
release] Retrieved from https://www.jse.co.za/news/jse-launches-high-tech-colocation- 
centre on December 8, 2015.  
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (2015a). Market Profile, August 2015. Retrieved from  
https://www.jse.co.za/services/market-data/market-statistics on September 25, 2015.  
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (2015b). History of the JSE. Retrieved from  
https://www.jse.co.za/about/history-company-overview on September 25, 2015. 
Katz, M. (1994). The future structure of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: A report of  
the research sub-committee to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Committee. Johannesburg  
Stock Exchange, Johannesburg, 283. 
Kendall, M. (1953). The analysis of economic time series - Part I: Prices. Journal of the Royal  
Statistical Society, Series A (General), 116(1), 11-25. 
Keynes, J. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London:  
Macmillan Cambridge University Press, for Royal Economic Society. 
Kruger, R., Toerien, F., & MacDonald, I. (2012). Nonlinear serial dependence in share  
returns on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The African Finance Journal, 14(2), 64-84. 
Kyle, A. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53(6), 1315-1336. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1994). Contrarian investment, extrapolation, and  
risk. The Journal of Finance, 49(5), 1541-1578. 
Lee, C., & Ready, M. (1991). Inferring trade direction from intraday data. Journal of  
Finance, 46(2), 733–747. 
 
 
72 | P a g e  
 
Lim, K., Brooks, R., & Hinich, M. (2008). Nonlinear serial dependence and the weak- 
form efficiency of Asian emerging stock markets. Journal of International Financial  
Markets, Institutions and Money, 18(5), 527–544.  
Liu, W. (2006). A liquidity-augmented capital asset pricing model. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 82(3), 631-671. 
Lo, A., & MacKinlay, C. (1990). When are contrarian profits due to stock market  
overreaction? Review of Financial Studies, 3(2), 175–205. 
Lo, A., & Wang, J. (2000). Trading volume: definitions, data analysis, and implications of 
portfolio theory. Review of Financial Studies, 13(2), 257–300. 
Madhavan, A. (1992). Trading mechanisms in securities markets. The Journal of Finance,  
47(2), 607-641.  
Madhavan, A., Richardson, M., & Roomans, M. (1997). Why do security prices change? A 
transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks. Review of Financial Studies, 10(4), 1035-1064. 
Mangani, R. (2007). Distributional properties of JSE prices and returns. Investment Analysts 
Journal, 66, 57 – 72. 
McClelland, D. (2014). The liquidity-augmented CAPM: Empirical evidence from the JSE.  
(Unpublished master’s dissertation). University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  
McMillan, D. (2004). Non-linear predictability of UK stock market returns. Money Macro 
and Finance, Research Group Conference 2003 (63), Money Macro and Finance Research 
Group. 
Menkveld, A. (2013). High frequency trading and the new market makers. Journal of  
Financial Markets, 16, 712–740. 
 
73 | P a g e  
 
Muranaga, J. (1999). Dynamics of market liquidity of Japanese stocks: An analysis of tick- 
by-tick data of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In Bank for International Settlements, Market 
liquidity: Research findings and selected policy implications, 11, (pp. 1-25). CGFS 
Papers, Bank for International Settlements. 
Muranaga, J., & Shimizu, T. (1999). Market microstructure and market liquidity. In Bank  
for International Settlements, Market liquidity: Research findings and selected policy 
implications, 11, (pp. 1-28). CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements. 
Nam, K. (2003). The asymmetric reverting property of stock returns. Studies in Nonlinear  
Dynamics and Econometrics, 6(4), 1-16. 
O’Hara, M. (1997). Market Microstructure Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell  
Publishers.  
O’Hara, M. (2015). High frequency market microstructure. Journal of Financial Economics,  
116(2), 257-270.  
Osborne, M. (1959). Brownian motion in the stock market. Operations Research, 7(2),  
145-173. 
Page, D., Britten, J., & Auret, C. (2016). Idiosyncratic risk and anomaly persistence on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Investment Analysts Journal, 45(1), 31-46. 
Pastor, L., & Stambaugh, R. (2003). Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal of  
Political Economy, 111(3), 642–685. 
Poterba, J., & Summers, L. (1988). Mean reversion in stock prices: Evidence and  
implications. Journal of Financial Economics, 22(1), 27-59. 
Riordan, R., & Storkenmaier, A. (2012). Latency, liquidity and price discovery. Journal of  
Financial Markets, 15(4), 416–437. 
74 | P a g e  
 
Roberts, H. (1959). Stock market ‘patterns’ and financial analysis: Methodological  
suggestions. The Journal of Finance, 14(1), 1-10. 
Samuelson, P. (1965). Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly. Industrial 
Management Review, 6(2), 41-49. 
Schreiber, P., & Schwartz, R. (1986). Price discovery in securities markets. The Journal 
of Portfolio Management, 12(4), 43-48. 
Shiller, R. (1981). Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in  
dividends? American Economic Review, 71(3), 421-436. 
Shiller, R. (2003). From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 83-104. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). The limits of arbitrage. The Journal of Finance, 52(1),  
35-55.  
Smith, G. (2008). Liquidity and the informational efficiency of African stock markets. South  
African Journal of Economics, 76(2), 161-175.  
Smith, G., Jefferis, K., & Ryoo, H. (2002). African stock markets: Multiple variance ratio 
tests of random walks. Applied Financial Economics, 12(7), 475-484.  
Stoll, H. (2006). Electronic trading in stock markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
20(1), 153–174. 
Strebel, P. (1977). The limited efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Investment  
Analysts Journal, 10, 15-20. 
Thompson, A., & Ward, M. (1995). The Johannesburg Stock Exchange as an 
efficient market: A review. Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 19, 33- 
63. 
75 | P a g e  
 
Unterhorst, A. (2014). The asymmetric reverting property of stock returns on the JSE: An  
ANAR-GJR GARCH approach. (Unpublished master’s dissertation). University of the  
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  
Working, H. (1960). Note on the correlation of first differences of averages in a 
random chain. Econometrica, 28(4), 916-918. 
World Federation of Exchanges (2013). Monthly Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-reports on October 5, 2015.  
Zito, F. (2014). Algorithmic trading and the liquidity of the JSE. (Unpublished master’s 
dissertation). University of Pretoria, Pretoria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 | P a g e  
 
7 APPENDIX I 
 
Table A1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance 
series, Regime 1. 
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Table A2: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance series, 
Regime 1. 
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Table A3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance 
series, Regime 2. 
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Table A4: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance series, 
Regime 2. 
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Table A5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance 
series, Regime 3. 
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Table A6: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the order imbalance series, 
Regime 3. 
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Table A7: Correlogram of daily order imbalance, Regime 1. 
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Table A8: Correlogram of daily order imbalance, Regime 2. 
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Table A9: Correlogram of daily order imbalance, Regime 3. 
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8 APPENDIX II 
 
Table A10: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the imbalance 
coefficient series. 
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Table A11: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the imbalance coefficient series. 
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Table A12: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the aggregate turnover 
series. 
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Table A13: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the aggregate turnover series. 
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Table A14: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the first difference in 
aggregate turnover series. 
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Table A15: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the first difference in aggregate 
turnover series. 
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Table A16: Granger causality test results of market liquidity (proxied by the first 
difference in aggregate turnover) and market inefficiency (proxied by order imbalance 
coefficient in monthly regression of daily returns on order imbalances), Entire Sample. 
  
Table A17: Granger causality test results of market liquidity (proxied by the first 
difference in aggregate turnover) and market inefficiency (proxied by order imbalance 
coefficient in monthly regression of daily returns on order imbalances), Regime 1. 
 
Table A18: Granger causality test results of market liquidity (proxied by the first 
difference in aggregate turnover) and market inefficiency (proxied by order imbalance 
coefficient in monthly regression of daily returns on order imbalances), Regime 2. 
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Table A19: Granger causality test results of market liquidity (proxied by the first 
difference in aggregate turnover) and market inefficiency (proxied by order imbalance 
coefficient in monthly regression of daily returns on order imbalances), Regime 3. 
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9 APPENDIX III 
 
Table A20: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, 
Regime 1. 
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Table A21: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, Regime 1. 
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Table A22: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, 
Regime 2. 
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Table A23: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, Regime 2. 
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Table A24: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, 
Regime 3. 
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Table A25: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the daily return series, Regime 3. 
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Table A26: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 1. 
 
 
 
100 | P a g e  
 
Table A27: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 2. 
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Table A28: Correlogram of daily returns, Regime 3. 
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Table A29: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the squared daily 
return series, Regime 1. 
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Table A30: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the squared daily return series, 
Regime 1. 
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Table A31: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the squared daily 
return series, Regime 2. 
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Table A32: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the squared daily return series, 
Regime 2. 
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Table A33: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results on the squared daily 
return series, Regime 3. 
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Table A34: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results on the squared daily return series, 
Regime 3. 
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Table A35: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 1. 
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Table A36: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 2. 
 
 
 
110 | P a g e  
 
Table A37: Correlogram of squared daily returns, Regime 3. 
 
 
 
